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Abstract
The advanced encryption standard (AES) is the premier symmetric key cryptosystem in use
today. Given its prevalence, the security provided by AES is of utmost importance. Technology
is advancing at an incredible rate, in both capability and popularity, much faster than its rate of
advancement in the late 1990s when AES was selected as the replacement standard for DES.
Although the literature surrounding AES is robust, most studies fall into either theoretical or
practical yet infeasible. This research takes the unique approach drawn from the performance
field and dual nature of AES performance. It uses benchmarks to assess the performance
potential of computer systems for both general purpose and AES. Since general performance
information is readily available, the ratio may be used as a predictor for AES performance and
consequently attack potential. The design involved distributing USB drives to facilitators
containing a bootable Linux operating system and the benchmark instruments. Upon boot, these
devices conducted the benchmarks, gathered system specifications, and submitted them to a
server for regression analysis. Although it is likely to be many years in the future, the results of
this study may help better predict when attacks against AES key lengths will become feasible.

The views expressed in this dissertation are those of the author and do not reflect the official
policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the United States
Government.
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CHAPTER ONE
Since the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) announced the
advanced encryption standard (AES) in 2001, it has become the standard symmetric-key, blockcipher for use in both commercial and government sectors (NIST, 2001). Today, AES is in
widespread, global use and one of the most popular cryptographic algorithms of the twenty-first
century (Bogdanov, Khovratovich, & Rechberger, 2011; Soleimany, Sharifi, & Aref, 2010).
Because of its popularity, ensuring the security of AES is vital (Jayasinghe, Ragel, Ambrose,
Ignjatovic, & Parameswaran, 2014). Consequently, the cryptographic community placed the
evaluation of the security provided AES as one of its top priorities (Alghazzawi, Hasan, &
Trigui, 2010). The scholarly cryptographic community ensures the security of algorithms by
evaluating the key lengths, available processing power, and ensuring no shortcuts exist by
emulating adversaries attempting to subvert or break the algorithms (Güneysu, Kasper, Novotný,
& Paar, 2008). Since the key lengths intuitively have an adequate margin of security, the
literature focuses on emulating attacking adversaries (Burr, 2003).
Topic Overview/Background
Throughout history, the art of communicating secrets, cryptography, was a prominent
tool for rulers, militaries, and uprisings. Since the dawn of transformative writing in ancient
Egypt, components of cryptography have independently evolved and assembled leading to the
state of cryptography today (Kahn, 1996). Modern cryptography, including AES, is secret only
in the key; the details of the algorithm are public. This principle dates back to the late 1800s as
Kerckhoffs realized the need for reformed cryptography during the rise of the telegraph, and
published Cryptographie Militaire (Singh, 1999). This era of cryptography began in the 1970s as
the National Bureau of Standards (NBS), the predecessor organization to NIST, began the
10

process of defining and eventually selecting the first public encryption standard: the data
encryption standard (DES) (NBS, 1972).
DES remained secure until the late 1990s when its short key length rapidly caused the
algorithm to become irrelevant. Shortly thereafter, NIST selected AES as the next block cipher
standard. It quickly became the focal point of the cryptographic community (Biryukov &
Großschädl, 2012; Bogdanov, Khovratovich, & Rechberger, 2011). As the second decade of the
twenty-first century was coming to a close, the interest in the longevity and continued use of
AES has grown. DES lasted around 20 years (Curtin & Dolske, 1998; NBS, 1977). AES was
designed to last at least 20 years (Baudron et at., 1999; Burr, 2003). NIST monitors AES and
ensures it is secure for continued use every five years for the next five years, but both the state of
computing and the importance of technology today are very different from the late 1990s when
NIST began the process of selecting AES (Barker & Roginsky, 2015).
The connected world is much larger today than it was when DES was the leading
cryptographic solution. Up from less than one percent in 1995, the increase in the last two
decades is massive. Based on data from the International Telecommunication Union, the World
Bank, and the United Nations, nearly half of the world’s population uses the Internet (Internet
Live Stats, 2018). While users are one component of the connected devices, many more devices
are online than distinct users. These devices range from the personal devices used to access the
Internet – such as smartphones, tablets, and personal computers – to the commercial and
corporate devices that host the Internet and its many services – such as routers, switches, and
servers. Given the massive increase in users and the reliance on technology and connectivity,
ensuring the security of those communications is even more critical.

11

The state of computing is also significantly advanced from its state in the late 1990s. One
example of this change is the availability of processing power. In 1997, the top supercomputer in
the world, Intel’s ASCI Red, was capable of 1,453.0 giga-floating point operations per second
(GFLOPS) (Top500, 2017). Today, a single consumer device, the Nvidia GeForce GTX 1080 TI,
is capable of 11,340 GFLOPS (Tech Power Up, 2018). In just 20 years, many consumer homes
contain the equivalent processing power of the world’s foremost supercomputers. Other
innovations, including tri-gate transistors, multi-core architectures, improvements to lithography,
and expanded instruction sets, including AES hardware instructions, have had a profound
influence on the availability of processing power and the level of global computational potential.
These changes, combined with the massive increase in the number of interconnected devices,
causes concern about the events that brought an end to DES occurring with AES.
Problem Opportunity Statement
AES is among the most popular cryptographic algorithms in use today (Bogdanov,
Khovratovich, & Rechberger, 2011; Soleimany, Sharifi, & Aref, 2010). It is the premier
symmetric-key, block-cipher in both the government and commercial sectors. Given its
importance, the literature concerning its security is robust. The literature also includes
implementations, components of the algorithm, and various cryptographic attacks. Despite the
importance of its security, the study of attack feasibility has a limited stake in the literature. A
component of the limited share in the literature for attack feasibility may be the perceived
security of the key lengths, as even the smallest key length was predicted to remain secure for
close to six decades (Burr, 2003).
Another component of the limited attack feasibility coverage in the literate may relate to
the current state of practical attacks. Practical attacks seek to subvert the algorithm rather than
directly defeat it. All known, feasible attacks fall into this category. The lack of the
12

cryptographic complexity component of an attack does not encourage the community to consider
sheer feasibility. Instead, rough estimations rely on approximations, such as Moore’s Law, to
project when the availability of computing may intersect with the strength of each key length.
Examining the relationships between traditional benchmark results and AES performance
benchmarks for different, general-purpose hardware configurations may identify correlated or
causal relationships in addition to potential grouping around hardware types. Those relationships
could provide a foundational component for practical modeling of cryptographic attack potential
by establishing a ratio for general-purpose systems. The practical modeling may enhance the
accuracy of attack feasibility assessments and help the security community by better projecting
key-length vulnerabilities allowing industry more time to transition to stronger AES keys.
Purpose Statement
The purpose of this research was to contribute to the security community at large through
this addition to the AES body of knowledge. This dissertation accomplished the contribution in
the categories of attack feasibility and performance. Additionally, the study may serve as a
foundation for future attack feasibility research by expanding the scope of the experiment to
additional categories of hardware platforms. Finally, the literature review provides a recent
summary of the breadth of the literature surrounding AES from the background of the previous
standard to the most recent developments.
As with the attack feasibility literature on the preceding algorithm, DES, AES attack
feasibility literature could be grouped into three categories. The categories of strictly theoretical,
special hardware, and general hardware encompass the spectrum of attack feasibility literature
and considerations. With DES, the literature, shifted from theoretical, through special purpose, to
general purpose as processing power approached the point of feasible attacks against the key
length. This study focused on the general hardware subset of attack feasibility. Although the
13

results regarding attack feasibility were expected to be far from actually feasible, the study used
the practical approach of benchmarks.
The goal of the attack feasibility component of this research was not to discover that
attacks are feasible. Rather this study sought to assess the pure feasibility of an attack, by testing
the ratio between traditional benchmarks and AES benchmarks on a variety of hardware
platforms. If the results indicated that general performance correlates or is a valid predictor for
AES performance, the ratios could then predict the attack potential of future systems.
Additionally, the ratios were expected to differ from system to system. Groups around hardware
components, including the amount of memory, the type of processor, or the presence of AES
special instructions, may provide additional utility or applicability to future hardware platforms.
Research Question(s)
The purpose of the study was to address two concise research questions. These questions
were founded in the problem statement and provided the basis for the hypotheses.
R1: How correlated are the results of traditional benchmarks and AES benchmarks
conducted on systems in the sample population?
R2: How do the hardware configurations of systems in the sample population affect the
level of correlation between traditional benchmarks and AES benchmarks?
Hypotheses
This study tested four hypotheses regarding the relationship between traditional and AES
benchmarks to address the research questions. Collecting both benchmarks and hardware
configuration information, including the processor, memory, and presence of AES hardware
instructions, comprised the testing of the hypotheses. The first alternate hypothesis, H0A, states
that statistically significant correlations will exist between the results of traditional benchmarks
in floating-point operations per second (FLOPS) and AES benchmarks. The rest of the
14

hypotheses relate to the specifics of the hardware. The first hardware component considers the
presence or absence of AES instructions, which H1 addresses. However, this hypothesis is a
unique case since most modern processors have AES instructions and may not make it possible
to determine its effect. The processor type and memory may also have an impact on the results,
which H2 and H3 address to determine if any groups in the results exist. If groups do exist, they
may allow a component, or components, to be used as a predictor. The null and alternate
expressions of each hypothesis are expressed as follows:
H00: No statistically significant correlations exist between traditional benchmarks and
AES benchmarks conducted on systems in the sample population.
H0A: Statistically significant correlations exist between traditional benchmarks and AES
benchmarks conducted on systems in the sample population.
H10: The AES hardware instructions component of the hardware configurations of
systems in the sample population has no statistically significant effects on the level of correlation
between traditional benchmarks and AES benchmarks.
H1A: The AES hardware instructions component of the hardware configurations of
systems in the sample population has statistically significant effects on the level of correlation
between traditional benchmarks and AES benchmarks.
H20: The processor type component of the hardware configurations of systems in the
sample population has no statistically significant effects on the level of correlation between
traditional benchmarks and AES benchmarks.
H2A: The processor type component of the hardware configurations of systems in the
sample population has statistically significant effects on the level of correlation between
traditional benchmarks and AES benchmarks.
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H30: The memory component of the hardware configurations of systems in the sample
population has no statistically significant effects on the level of correlation between traditional
benchmarks and AES benchmarks.
H3A: The memory component of the hardware configurations of systems in the sample
population has statistically significant effects on the level of correlation between traditional
benchmarks and AES benchmarks.
Theoretical Perspectives/Conceptual Framework
Cryptographic attacks against AES provide components such as memory, data, and
compute as requirements for their execution (Nechvatal et al., 2000). Memory and data are
generally either feasible or infeasible without concern for the rapidly changing state of
computers today. Conversely, compute is based on the margin between the necessary compute to
break a key size and the available compute. Focusing on compute, the literature contains both
theoretical and practical approaches to attack feasibility. Attack feasibility was considered as
early as the AES conferences to determine which algorithm would be selected and continues to
be considered by NIST today.
Early cryptographic attack feasibility research for AES focused on the raw key length and
on partial implementations (Ferguson et al., 2000). The key length was a much-needed
improvement on 56-bit key length of DES, which became so feasible that it could be broken in a
day (McNett, 1999). It was suggested that the 128-, 192-, and 256-bit keys would endure for an
estimated six decades to several millennia (Burr, 2003). These estimations were beyond adequate
at the time but as compute continued to improve, the nature of feasibility estimations evolved.
The simple approximations addressed how processing power progressed to complex performance
considerations for modern, AES accelerated, and special-purpose systems.
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Throughout the body of knowledge, performance benchmarks typically focus on practical
usability (Schneier & Whiting, 2000; Yuan, He, Gong & Qiu, 2014). Some consider the
component of attack feasibility with performance (Biryukov & Großschädl, 2012; Manavski,
2007). To attack an algorithm, including brute-force key search, an adversary must conduct
components of the algorithm repeatedly. The components usually include the key expansion and
a trial decryption. This similarity causes both the usability-focused and cryptography-focused
AES performance research to have relevance to this study.

Figure 1. Related Topics by Daniel S. Hawthorne. Copyright 2018
This research draws its theoretical framework from several sources in the body of
knowledge. Figure 1 illustrates those sources as they relate to each other with the foundation of
the previous standard through the gap in the literature that this research sought to address. It
includes the background of DES for context and the breadth of the cryptographic literature on
AES. It follows the feasibility assessment component of the approach used by Biryukov and
Großschädl (2012), which considered a best-case attack on a large-scale theoretical, special17

purpose system. This current study considered the hypothetical, best-case scenarios while
placing emphasis on the more practical approach of benchmarks. It draws the benchmark and
performance ratio components from the system performance planning and AES performance
sections of the literature.
Assumptions/Biases
The several personal biases, which lead to assumptions about the topic area, were
identified as being acquired during the literature review process; they are consequently based on
the body of knowledge. They are described here to ensure they do not manifest in the literature
review without proper references. Although these assumptions and biases are based on the body
of knowledge and on the facts, they are not proven in the scope of this study or they cannot be
proven at this time. It is because of the lack of proof that these conjectures fall into this category.
The first assumption is that AES in all key lengths is adequately secure today. The second
is that AES will fall into the feasible attack range sooner than initially projected. The third is that
implementation weaknesses, side-channel-attacks, and other means of reducing the complexity
of cryptographic attacks will continue to present the greatest threats to the security of the
algorithm. The fourth is that the impact of a single AES key-length falling into the feasible range
without significant time for the technical industry to move away from that key length would be
significantly more damaging today than DES was in the late 1990s. These presuppositions led to
the topic decision for this dissertation.
The first assumption, that all AES key lengths are adequately secure today, is based on
assessments throughout the body of knowledge ranging from early assessments of the selection
process in 2003 to the latest NIST assessment in 2015. In the summary document, which depicts
the selection criteria process and attack estimations, Burr (2003) describes the state of attack
feasibility estimation referencing Moore’s Law as the “best estimator we have” (p.45). This early
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estimation predicted the 128-bit key length would be as secure in the year 2066 as an 80-bit
algorithm was in 2003. At the time, an 80-bit key was well beyond the margin security for even
the most sensitive usage.
NIST reviews approved security functions, including encryption algorithms, hash
functions, key exchange, and secure random number generators, every five years. The review
process involves providing a projected timeframe for each algorithm and key length in which the
key length for the algorithm is expected to provide adequate security. NIST does not provide a
projected timeframe for continued use if the algorithm has no near-term security concerns. In
November 2015, NIST again reaffirmed all key lengths of AES as being adequately secure
without providing a projected timeframe (Barker & Roginsky, 2015). The NIST affirmation is an
authoritative assessment of the near-term security provided by AES, but its focus remains on the
five-year usability.
The second assumption, that AES will fall into the feasible attack range sooner than
initially projected, relates to the designed longevity of AES during the selection process, which
was at least 20 years (Baudron et al., 1999). The initial feasibility assessments, however,
expected the key lengths to endure for around six decades (Burr, 2003). Many revolutionary
technology changes have influenced the departure from the rate of computing change that was
present in the 1990s. These technologies include multi-core CPUs, hardware AES acceleration,
and eventually the prevalence of quantum computing. The NIST assessment for continued use is
robust and detailed, however the initial longevity assessments were lacking (Barker & Roginsky,
2015; Burr, 2003).
The third assumption, that other means of subverting encryption or reducing
cryptographic attack complexity will present the greater threat, has held true from the AES

19

selection process until now. The only attack that has lower compute than brute force requires an
infeasible amount of cipher text in exchange for a minor reduction to compute (Bogdanov,
Khovratovich, & Rechberger, 2011). Although this attack is by definition a break, attacks which
require special, impractical circumstances such as partial implementations, related-keys, sidechannels, or access to plaintext will pose the more computationally feasible cryptographic
threats. The greatest threats are not purely cryptographic or necessarily technical. These threats
comprise external factors such as the ever-present human element, operating system
vulnerabilities, and other software on the system.
The fourth assumption relates to the impact of cryptographic attacks against AES
becoming feasible. The example case is DES. Attacks became feasible against DES prior to a
replacement (McNett, 1999). Additionally, DES lacked a structured transition, leaving a gap as it
was still in use seven years later (Kelley, 2006). The gap was partially filled by the triple data
encryption algorithm (TDEA), which simply increased the size of the key by conducting DES
two to three times (NIST, 1999b). However, due to DES becoming vulnerable prior to
projections, NIST enacted TDEA the same year that DES became vulnerable, leaving a gap in
security while industry adapted to the new standard. Given the increase in the size and reliance
on the Internet, a gap in the security provided by AES would cause substantially greater impact
than the gap in security of DES.
The combination of these intuitive factors led to further investigation into the possibility
that AES may fall into the feasible attack range sooner than intended. Although AES is secure
today and will remain secure for the immediate future, barring a revolutionary jump in the rate of
technological progress, the ability to further out and more accurately project key length
vulnerabilities may allow industry a larger transition time to avoid the issues that arose when
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DES transitioned. This endeavor is even more critical since a transition without a major gap in
the security provided by AES is increasingly important relative to the usage and dependence on
connectivity and security.
Significance of the Study
The research topic described in this dissertation sought to add to the body of knowledge
and the security community in two ways. The first relates to the thorough nature of the literature
review. The study comprises an exhaustive attempt to include every piece of available, relevant
research relating to AES, including attacks, attack feasibility, performance, and security, in
addition to related background information including DES and the changes to state of computing.
The inclusive combination of these elements is not found elsewhere in the body of knowledge.
The comparison of related publications and the logical progression of the literature review makes
it especially applicable to this study and future attack feasibility research.
The second, potentially significant contribution relates to the possible findings of the
study. If the relationship between traditional benchmarks and AES performance shows that AES
performance is strongly correlated to traditional benchmarks or that traditional benchmarks may
be used as a predictor for AES performance, the results may be able to help project future attack
feasibility. Where traditional performance-based attack feasibility estimations rely on gross
approximations, such as Moore’s law, the correlation of AES performance and FLOPS may
provide a more accurate means of estimating attack feasibility potential based on readily
available information (Burr, 2003). The culmination of the predictive potential has at least three
use cases: better projecting the need for key length migrations, determining the attack potential
of new technologies, and determining the attack feasibility of new attacks.
The gap in security provided by DES, as brute-force attacks became feasible long before
industry adopted an alternate standard, demonstrates the need for longer timeframes for industry
21

to adapt to new standards before the previous standards become vulnerable (Curtin & Dolske,
1998; IETF, 2006). The multiple key lengths of AES are a mitigating factor by design, however,
the results of this research could allow additional warning beyond the five years of expected
usability that NIST provides (Barker & Dang, 2015). This predictive model could be applied to
many different subsets, from global compute to individual systems, to determine attack potential
against different key lengths.
The second use case involves the attack potential of new technologies. A breakthrough or
revolutionary new technology may result in uncharacteristically significant improvements in
processing power. The recently announced Nvidia Titan V (2017) is approaching the scale of the
most powerful supercomputer in 2005 (Top500.org). Twelve years is not a huge gap between
cutting-edge, global computing power and computing power available to consumers. A
revolutionary new technology might further reduce that gap. If the gap were abruptly shortened,
the processing power available could quickly make otherwise infeasible attacks feasible. This
research is especially applicable to improvements in large scale computing because it uses the
same benchmark instrument that Top500 uses to measure supercomputers: high performance
Linpack (HPL).
Determining the attack feasibility of new attacks is another potential application of this
research. Although most attacks seek to subvert encryption, as they are generally more feasible,
even some subversions require AES operations. Furthermore, a new break of AES with
significant reduction in processing power required to conduct the attack may require a given
number, likely still a massive number, of AES operations. Many attacks include a paragraph or
even less about feasibility. This study could be used as a foundation for more accurate
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assessments of processing power requirements with little or no more effort required than the
rough estimation usually included in cryptographic attack publications.
Delimitations
The delimitations are in place on the experiment to constrain the scope and variables to a
manageable number. The delimitation reduces the ability to extend the results to a larger set of
processing platforms, but it is necessary to keep the experiment uniform. The delimitation is the
inclusion of only the x86_64 architecture sometimes referred to as x64. Although several other
system architectures exist, including ARM and GPUs, the x86_64 is the widespread architecture
found in the majority of personal computer and server CPUs. ARM and GPUs do represent
significant portions of the global compute, but the design of a collection instrument to measure
performance on the vastly different platforms would essentially require three entirely different
collection mechanisms, which would not align well with a single study.
Limitations
Limitations relate to the human element. Since the only component of this research
involving humans is in facilitation, the currently identified limitation related to potential
mistakes during the facilitation process. The limitation is based on temperature. Overheated
systems throttle performance to reduce heat. The mitigation is two-fold. The instructions that
accompany the collection instrument include a wait period for systems to cool down if they were
in heavy use before booting to the collection instrument. Additionally, the instructions request
users to not run the tests on systems when the ambient temperature is outside their normal
operating temperature range. The second component of the mitigation is found in the design of
the collection instrument and the nature of computer systems. Unlike humans, computers
complete tasks with near identical performance each time. Identical configurations and repeated
tests throughout the sample will help identify systems that have throttled due to overheating.
23

Definition of Terms
This section contains the definition of the terms used throughout the study to provide
clarity, context, and as a central location for reference. The definitions align with those most
frequently found throughout the body of knowledge, providing clarity where variations exist.
Some additional terms are defined specifically for the context of this study, such as benchmark
and system, which may have a variety of definitions in different contexts.
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is the symmetric-key, block-cipher standardized by
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in 2001 (NIST, 2001). Today, AES is
in widespread, global use and one of the most popular cryptographic algorithms of the twentyfirst century (Bogdanov, Khovratovich, & Rechberger, 2011; Soleimany, Sharifi, & Aref, 2010).
Internally, AES is a subset of the cipher, Rijndael, which was the winning algorithm of the AES
candidate competition. NIST specified the block size, rounds, and key lengths for AES based on
the available configurations for Rijndael (NIST, 2001). The specifications included 128-bit
block, 128-, 192-, and 256-bit keys and 10-, 12-, and 14-rounds per key size respectively. The
algorithm begins with key expansion to create a unique key for each round. The cipher itself
involves byte substitution, shifting rows, mixing columns, and the addition of the round key for
each round (Daemen & Rijmen, 1999).
Benchmark refers to the process of measuring system performance. Traditional
benchmarks measure general purpose compute or operations that easily approximate generalpurpose performance, such as FLOPS. Many benchmark solutions exist in the literature and
industry, but this study employs only a couple. Linpack is a standard FLOPS benchmark utility
used by leading performance evaluation organizations, including Top500. It is used by this study
to measure FLOPS. Cryptsetup, an encryption utility included in many Linux distributions,
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contains an encryption and decryption benchmark, which includes AES. It is used to measure
AES throughput, which is translated to AESOPS for this study.
Cryptanalysis is the processes of defeating of cryptosystems (SANS Institute, 2001). It
involves gaining access to the plaintext or recovering the key by means other than the intended
use of the cryptosystem. Kerckhoffs introduced the necessity of cryptanalysis as means of
determining the security provided by a cryptosystem in the late 1800s (Kahn, 1996). Since then,
the role of cryptanalysis has grown from simply trying to break an adversary’s cryptosystem to
gain a military or strategic advantage to trying to break every trusted and used cryptosystem to
determine its security (Singh, 2000).
Cryptography is the art of communicating secrets through techniques including the
transformation of writing, substitution of characters, and diffusion of the plaintext throughout the
ciphertext.
Cryptology refers to the combined study of cryptanalysis and cryptography (SANS
Institute, 2001).
Data Encryption Standard (DES) preceded AES. It was announced by National Bureau
of Standards (NBS), the predecessor of NIST, in 1977 as the first open encryption standard
(NBS, 1977). International Business Machines (IBM) designed the internal algorithm in 1974,
although it was slightly revised before standardization in 1977. Attacks against DES became
both feasible and practice between 1997 and 1999 (Curtin & Dolske, 1998; McNett, 1999). Even
though DES was replaced by the triple data encryption algorithm (TDEA) in 1999 and AES in
2001, it was still in use in 2006 (Kelly, 2006; NIST, 1999b; NIST, 2001). As the preceding
standard to AES, the process of selecting DES, the lifespan of the algorithm, and the issues with
transition away from DES provide insight into those components of the current standard.
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National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is a robust United States
government organization with a variety of roles. This study considers only the computer security
division of NIST, specifically the role involving the selection and maintenance of cryptographic
standards. NIST and its predecessor organization, the National Bureau of Standards (NBS) led
the selection process for standards examined in this study including DES and AES in addition to
many others. NIST also monitors the margin of security provided by each cryptographic standard
and provides recommendations for continued use (Barker & Dang, 2015).
Processing Power refers to the measurable performance of a system. In this study,
processing power is synonymous with compute. The measurable performance is usually in terms
of an operation type per second. Floating point operations per second (FLOPS) is a well-known
performance standard that is published and measured by various organizations in addition to
vendors. The performance in terms of AES operations per second (AESOPS) is a less common
unit, but it is used throughout this study as key component of AES performance estimation.
System refers to any device with a microprocessor. These devices range from the largest
supercomputers to the smallest Internet of Things (IoT) devices. They include devices that access
services such as personal computers, smart phones, and wearables. They also include devices
that provide services like routers, servers, and other network devices. Multiple systems may
comprise a system internally or in a distributed fashion. Systems have two overarching
categories: general-purpose and application-specific. Although application specific may solely
comprise of application specific integrated circuits (ASICs), they are still considered systems for
the purpose of this study.
General Overview of the Research Design
The current study examined the relationships between traditional benchmarks using
FLOPS and specific benchmarks using AESOPS to answer the research questions and fulfil the
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purpose statement. The collection phase used a Linux-based, bootable USB collection device.
The collection devices were distributed to facilitators who volunteered their systems for the
study. Volunteers facilitated the research by booting systems to the USB collection devices. Each
device ran benchmark scripts for AES and the traditional performance value of FLOPS in
addition to collecting system information including the CPU and memory. The scripts reported
the results to an EC2 server that validated input and stored the results. The collection phase was
repeated until an adequate sample size and variety was reached.
The sampling will be purposive, specifically aimed for a variety of hardware
configurations. Repeat configurations served as additional validation of the consistency of the
benchmark results. Once adequate sample and variety were reached, the results were transferred
to a spreadsheet using a Python script. Before continuing, further validation of the data and
handling of errors and outliers were considered. Once the data was validated, statistical analysis
commenced to measure the relationships between the benchmark results and impacts of the
system components. The results of those tests were used to either reject the null or fail to reject
the null hypothesis.
Summary of Chapter One
This chapter introduced the proposed research topic. It included the identification and
articulation of the problem which this research sought to address. It demonstrated the opportunity
to contribute by conducting the proposed research. The chapter also introduced the overarching
purpose of the research and the larger problem that purpose falls into. It mentioned the specific
research questions and the hypotheses that were addressed. It also included the biases,
assumptions, limitations, delimitations, and the overview of the research design, detailed in
Chapter 3.
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Organization of Dissertation
Chapter 2 of the dissertation is the literature review. It contains a topological review of
the body of knowledge, which is organized chronologically within each topic. The body of
knowledge includes AES, cryptography, attack feasibility, the changing computing environment,
and performance planning. Those fields form the background for the study. The gap exists within
the union of those fields, where attack feasibility and performance planning meet.
Chapter 3 of the proposal begins with the background and traditions behind security,
encryption, and cryptographic research. It continues to present the details of the problem
addressed by the research and the opportunity to contribute to the community. The research
questions, hypothesis, and design precede the details of the design, collection procedures, and
quantitative methods, which will be used to analyze the data in Chapter 4. Interpretations of the
findings and future recommendations are presented in Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER TWO
This chapter contains a topological, chronological review of the literature surrounding the
topic. It begins with the context of the events leading to the advanced encryption standard (AES).
This context includes the previous standard, the data encryption standard (DES), the lessons
learned which influenced the AES criteria, and the advances in cryptography which DES brought
about that apply to AES. The chapter continues with the announcement and criteria for the new
standard, AES, the selection process, and the reasons why NIST selected the algorithm, Rijndael.
The state of computing throughout the lifespans of both DES and AES is also relevant.
Computing from the time that DES was selected to the time that it became vulnerable parallels
the potential for the changing compute environment to effect AES. Attack feasibility throughout
both DES and AES are also included and closely relate to one another and to the changing state
of computing.

Figure 2. Related Topics by Daniel S. Hawthorne. Copyright 2018
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Once NIST announced AES, the cryptographic community shifted focus to the new
standard. Early attack feasibility estimations, which initially validated algorithmic endurance and
ensured the minimal secure variant was adequately secure, relied on very simple approximations
and often referred to Moore’s Law to anticipate the rate of change. These early estimations relied
on the simplest form of performance planning, but they did establish the relationship between
those fields. Performance planning includes considerations for different system components and
various methods of predicting system performance. Attack feasibility combines the performance
considerations and cryptographic attacks to determine the security provided by AES. Figure 2
depicts the relation of the topics covered in this chapter which lead to the gap addressed by this
study.
Foundation of the Modern Cryptographic Era
Cryptography, the communication of secret messages, originates from ancient Egypt
(Kahn, 1996). The first practice considered a cryptographic technique was the transformation of
hieroglyphics to dignify writing. Cryptography evolved from that simple beginning through
history as it found use in military, political, insurgent, and religious contexts. Classic
cryptography had various forms at it progressed ranging from phonetic and alphabetic
substitutions to simple transpositions. The fundamental cryptographic concepts of substitution,
replacing a symbol or letter with another, and transposition, the shifting of characters, endure
today as components of modern cryptography. Cryptography evolved independently in different
regions for different reasons, but these foundational concepts were found in many different
independent branches.
Although substitution and transposition remain as foundational to cryptography today,
the first historic event that had a profound impact on modern cryptography did not occur until the
emergence of the telegraph. The invention of the telegraph in the nineteenth century marked a
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major change in technology and resultantly in cryptography. The telegraph would replace handcarried messages as the transmission medium of secret messages. As this transition began,
Kerckhoffs, a leading cryptographer at that time, published Cryptographie Militaire (Kahn,
1996). His work, published in 1893, included a comprehensive history of cryptography
encompassing every known method. He additionally presented two overarching principles and
six specific requirements for cryptography. His first principles involved the difference in cipher
requirements for short term exchanges of written messages and the requirements for military use
for an extended period of time.
The second overarching concept was that cryptanalysis, the process of defeating a cipher
without knowledge of the key, was the only way to measure the cipher’s strength. This principle
endures today; it is the same approach used for assessing the security of DES, all of the AES
candidates, and every other form of cryptography today. Of the six specific requirements, the
second became a foundational concept of open cryptographic standards; the presence of all six
would be indicative of the ideal cipher. World War I had a significant impact on cryptography
with William Frederick Friedman coining the term cryptanalysis and beginning the governmental
inclusion of cryptanalysts. Cryptography also had a role in World War II with the Enigma
machine. These events were important precursors to the modern cryptographic era, but they were
arguably not in themselves as crucial as the work done by Kerckhoffs in the late 1800s (Singh,
2000).
In 1972, the National Bureau of Standards (NBS), the predecessor organization to NIST,
began the process of defining and eventually selecting the first public encryption standard (NBS,
1972). This event began the cultural departure from disparate, secretive, and closed-source
cryptographic methods to standardized, open-source solutions. This cultural shift marked a large
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step toward the cipher that Kerckhoffs described nearly 80 years earlier. Open standards
intrinsically met the second specific requirement, that compromise of the system not
inconvenience the correspondents, which is often restated as a cryptosystem should be secret
only in the key. Six years later, the data encryption standard (DES) emerged as the product of this
transition. DES endured for about 20 years before attacks entered the feasible range (Electronic
Frontier Foundation, 1998a).
Leading to the Advanced Encryption Standard
The events leading to the call for a new encryption standard are an important contextual
component of the background of AES. The components of the previous standard, the data
encryption standard (DES), and the events leading to its abrogation, influenced initial
requirements for AES. The attacks against DES entered the realm of financial and practical
feasibility. Although an interim solution was in place, it had its own set of problems. The risk
associated with continued use of DES were too great. In response to these concerns, the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) announced the call for AES candidates in 1997
(NIST, 1997).
In 1972, the National Bureau of Standards (NBS), the predecessor of NIST, initiated the
effort to develop computer security standards (NBS, 1978). At the time, practical encryption was
just emerging as a security concept. The call for candidates had the requirements that the
algorithm would be publicly available, implementable on various platforms, and unambiguous,
having a single, symmetric key. In 1973, the first call went unfulfilled. The only notable
suggestion was a digital implementation of a one-time-pad (Davis, 1978). The failure of the first
solicitation to find a suitable candidate produced positive interest in the community. By the
second solicitation, several submissions were ready. One of those submissions became DES.
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Developed in 1974 by IBM, the algorithm officially became DES in 1977. The initial
projection for a feasible attack was 17 years to build a 70 million USD system that would be able
to recover one key per day on the megawatt power scale (NBS, 1977). This margin of security
was acceptable at the time. Over the lifespan of DES, the algorithm endured various forms of
cryptographic evaluations including feasibility assessments and criticism of the short key length
of 56-bits. New cryptographic techniques and improvements to known techniques emerged as
the security community continuously evaluated the first encryption standard.
In 1993, 16 years into the lifespan of the algorithm, the cryptanalysis of DES was
approaching maturity; three breakthroughs occurred which predicated the downfall of DES. The
first breakthrough was a cryptographic technique. Biham and Shamir (1993) discovered and
published the new technique, which become known as differential cryptanalysis. Differential
cryptanalysis was effective at reducing the attack complexity of substitution permutation
cryptosystems. A month before publication, Coppersmith, one of the members of the design team
announced that they were aware of differential cryptanalysis in 1974 and took design precautions
to partially mitigate the method but kept it a secret for the sake of national security (Biham &
Shamir, 1993).
The second breakthrough was an improvement on linear cryptanalysis. It was highly
capable against DES implementations that used half, 8-rounds, of the specified rounds, even
without the normally required known-plaintexts. The improved technique only required 229
cipher texts for English ASCII or 237 cipher texts for other data given the 8-round DES
implementation (Matsui, 1993). Although a cipher-text only attack against partial
implementations, the attack required significant known-plaintexts for the full 16-round
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implementation of DES. The margin of security provided by even the full implementation of
DES was closing on multiple fronts.
In 1994, Coppersmith responded to Biham and Shamir by publishing a feasibility
assessment of their attack and a reaffirmation that differential cryptanalysis was a design
consideration from the beginning. Coppersmith concluded that the attack presented by Biham
and Shamir demonstrated the success of the algorithm because it required an infeasible number
of chosen plaintexts for success, on the order of 1015 bytes. Although the open publication of
differential cryptanalysis was a huge breakthrough, it did not directly lead to the downfall of
DES. It did influence the AES design requirements as any new algorithm required resistance to
this cryptographic technique.
The final breakthrough in 1993 related to the key length of 56-bits. The short key length
did eventually lead to the downfall of DES. Wiener (1993) designed a particularly effective,
scalable DES key search chip. Given one million USD of the search chips, the resulting machine
would be capable of an exhaustive search of the key space every 3.5 hours. Although this
machine is not the first theoretical assessment of its type, it was by far the most capable and
economical. This brute-force method was quickly approaching the feasible point.
As computers continued to increase in availability and capability, the 56-bit key length of
DES became the focus of the cryptographic community. In January 1997, RSA Laboratories
began a series of secret-key challenges, which would continue for over a decade. The challenges
offered cash rewards for DES and RC5 key-recovery (RSA Laboratories, n.d.). RSA
Laboratories designed these challenges to assess the relative security provided by DES and RC5.
The first set of DES challenges, released on 28 January 1997, included what later became known
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as DES I (Curtin & Dolske, 1998). Two additional DES challenges followed as organizations
completed the challenges with increasing efficiency.
In June of 1997, a distributed computing project, named “DESCHALL” for DES
challenge, was awarded $10,000 for completing the first DES challenge. The coordination of
approximately 10,000 mid-1990s clients completed the exhaustion of the key space in under
three months (Curtin & Dolske, 1998). The leaders of the project published their method and
some observations from the orchestration of this historic success. The project marked the first
known use of distributed computing for a cryptographic purpose but also proved that distributed
computing could overcome the inefficiencies of software implementations.
The second DES challenge, DES II, consisted of two objectives. The first was to improve
on the rate that a distributed group could discover the key; the second was to solve the key by
another means besides exhaustion through a distributed approach (Electronic Frontier
Foundation, 1998a). Using a larger distributed pool and just 39 days in 1998, the first objective
revealed “The secret message is: Many hands make light work” (McNett, 1998, p. 1). The
Electronic Frontier Foundation (EEF) solved the second in 56 hours using a 200,000 USD
application specific machine, “Deep Crack”, which utilized application specific integrated
circuits (ASICs). This effort concretely demonstrated that financial investment quickly leads to
broken keys as they recovered, “The secret message is: It’s time for those 128-, 192-, and 256-bit
keys” (EFF, 1998a, p. 3).
The final DES challenge, DES III, presented by RSA Laboratories, required a further
improvement upon the speed (RSA Laboratories, 1999). The third challenge was solved by a
combination of the two parts of DES II. Together, Distributed.net and the EEF “Deep Crack”
machine recovered a key in less than a day that revealed the message “See you in Rome (second
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AES Conference, March 22-23, 1999)”. Distributed computing technologies together with EEF
published an immediate press release of their results (McNett, 1999).
DES was indisputably insecure. Through a series of DES challenges, from January 1997
to January of 1999, the cryptographic community proved that brute-force search of the 56-bit
DES key space was not only feasible, it was possible in less than a day (McNett, 1999). In
response to the growing threat of key-length vulnerability, NIST approved the triple data
encryption algorithm (TDEA), also known as triple DES (3DES), as an interim solution. TDEA
increased the key size to 112- or 168- bits while conducting three rounds of the DES algorithm
(NIST, 1999b). Although NIST provided TDEA as an interim solution as DES became
increasingly vulnerable, and despite the ease of transition compared to employing a new
standard, the lack of implementation time for the industry to adapt left a gap in security.
Despite DES entering the realm of attack feasibility in 1997 and becoming increasingly
practical as time continued, DES was still in use almost 10 years later (Kelly, 2006). Figure 3
depicts the transition timeline.

1977 - 1992
Normal Use
1977
DES

1997
Key Length
Vulnerable - Days
1993
Prototype
hardware
attack device

1999
Key Length
Vulnerable - Hours

1999
Replaced by
TDEA

2006
Still in use

Figure 3. DES timeline by Daniel S. Hawthorne. Copyright 2018
In 1977, the NBS made DES the first symmetric-key encryption standard. It endured 15
years of normal use until 1993 when the key-length was approaching the point of feasible attacks
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and the cryptographic attacks targeting the algorithm were approaching maturity. By 1997, a
small group of systems could break the encryption in days. Although DES was formally
superseded by TDEA in 1999, when it was vulnerable with just hours of dedication and a
moderate investment, it was still in use in 2006. In 2005, NIST published an official DES
transition plan to warn of the dangers of continued use and a final chance to transition to TDEA
or AES (NIST, 2005).
Despite the numerous demonstrated feasible attacks, many organizations continued to use
DES. The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) is the well-known source organization of
standards documents, known as Request for Comments (RFCs), which define the specifications
for every component of connectivity today. As an additional confirmation, the IETF published
RFC 4772 in 2006 as an informational RFC which conducted an in-depth review of the security
implications of using DES. The RFC served as a means of formal warning to entities still using
DES of the high-level of risk associated with continued use. Citing Moore’s law, RFC 4772
listed the expected cost of hardware and time to complete an attack at $15,625 and 0.5625 days
respectively (Kelly, 2006).
After the announcement of AES and the subsequent deprecation of DES, AES
cryptographic research efforts largely superseded DES efforts. Additionally, given the feasible
range had unequivocally arrived, research that did include DES focused on less specific block
ciphers with application to both AES and DES. In 2008, a unique attack platform emerged called
COPACOBANA. This platform used field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) to improve
efficiency and parallelism close to that of ASICs, with the added ability to reprogram the FPGAs
to conduct attacks against various algorithms. The designers found that COPACOBANA DES
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key recovery took only 6 days at the affordable price of 10,000 Euros for complete reusability
(Güneysu, Kasper, Novotný, & Paar, 2008).
The last specifically DES-focused contribution explored a graphics processing unit
(GPU) -based attack in 2010. The attack utilized a processing improvement specific to DES,
known as “bit splicing”, which was made possible by the many-core architecture of GPUs. The
authors found that a small cluster of general-purpose systems with Nvidia compute unified
device architecture (CUDA) GPUs was a formidable attack platform. Their clusters had between
7,168 and 10,560 CUDA cores, each GPU boasting between 128 and 240 cores; placing their
price mark near that of COPACOBANA. The research found that these attacks would take 18 to
25 days to complete (Agosta, Barenghi, Santis, & Pelosi, 2010).
The comparison of the top and bottom, 55nm-based GPUs used by Agosta et al. in 2010
with the high- and low-end, 16nm-based GPUs available in 2016, serves as an anecdotal example
of the impact of increasing availability of processing power on cryptography. Table 1 groups the
aforementioned GPUs with comparable models today to demonstrate the significant reduction in
price per core.
Table 1
GPU comparison price per core
Group

GPU

Year

CUDA cores

Launch price

Price per core

Low-end

GTS 250

2009

128

$199

$1.55

GPUs

GTX 1050

2016

640

$109

$0.17

High-end

GTX 295

2009

480

$500

$1.04

GPUs

GTX 1080

2016

2,560

$599

$0.23

Note. Table derived from data in the Tech Power Up GPU database (2018).
Additionally, GPU clock and memory bandwidth have improved dramatically (Tech
Power Up, 2018) furthering the improvement as an attack platform. Since Nvidia GPUs continue
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to use the same CUDA language and architecture, a pair of modern systems, each boasting a pair
of Nvidia GTX 1080s, would have the same number of CUDA cores that Agosta et al. had with
11 to 28 systems. It is reasonable to assume this pair of systems would complete the attack at
least as fast as Agosta et al. in 2010, if not faster thanks to the other GPU architecture
improvements.
From an estimated starting point of 70 million USD in 1977 and many years to
manufacture, attacks against DES became more feasible and attack platforms became more
economical and much faster than initially anticipated (NBS, 1977). By 1997, 250 thousand USD
completed an exhaustive attack in a matter of hours. A new standard was needed and called for
in 1997; however, DES use and research continued. By 2006, around 15 thousand USD invested
in ASICs and a few hours could produce a key (Kelly, 2006). In 2008, COPACOBANA took just
6 days (Güneysu et al., 2008). By 2010, general purpose hardware was as fast as 18 days (Agosta
et al., 2010). Today, just a pair of high-end, personal computers could easily outpace the
previous general-purpose estimation.
Selecting the Advanced Encryption Standard
In 1997, NIST requested candidate nominations for the new encryption standard. NIST
aptly incorporated lessons learned from DES throughout the process. The initial document
provided guidance for candidate algorithm submissions including non-technical requirements,
technical requirements, and evaluation criteria. It provided nine months of lead time for
submissions, potentially a lesson learned from the lack of viable solutions to the first call for
DES candidates. Similar to DES, the AES candidates had to be open source and royalty free; any
patented candidates had to agree up front to release their algorithm to the public if it was selected
as AES (NIST, 1997). The aforementioned non-technical requirements, together with the
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technical requirements, formed the prerequisites for consideration. The evaluation criteria would
determine the winner.
The technical requirements for the algorithm included three components. The first was
the type of cipher. Like DES, AES required candidates to be a symmetric key cipher, meaning
encryption and decryption use the same key. Second, the algorithm had to support at least three
key lengths: 128-, 192-, and 256-bit. NIST required the lengthened key lengths to mitigate the
computing factor that overcame DES, “The secret message is: It’s time for those 128-, 192-, and
256-bit keys” (EFF, 1998a). The multiple key lengths were a logical step from the single key
length of DES. As exhaustive attacks against the first key length become feasible, another two
key lengths would remain within the acceptable margin of security. The final technical
requirement pertained to the cipher type. Like DES, AES was required to be a block cipher;
unlike DES, it used a 128-bit rather than the 64-bit block used by DES.
The initially stated evaluation criteria included three components, however, many
subcomponents became sizable influencing factors as the process of selecting AES continued.
The first was security, as in, how much security did each candidate algorithm provide. The
second was cost. Cost in this case was in terms of performance and efficiency, although the
prerequisite of royalty free was mentioned again, it would have already been met for candidates
reaching the evaluation stage. The third was implementation characteristics. Implementation
characteristics focused on flexibility including additional block sizes, key sizes, implementations
on a variety of platforms, and algorithm modes (NIST, 1997).
The announcement for candidates also included the plan for the first AES conference and
two rounds of evaluations covering the above criteria. The author(s) of every viable candidate
algorithm were invited to present at the first AES conference. The first round of evaluations had
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the unique component of correctness, which ensures that the algorithms performed correctly
when compiled, which NIST conducted prior to acceptance (NIST, 1997). Both rounds of testing
would reconfirm the key sizes and block size, but would place the majority of the focus on
efficiency testing. The testing platforms were disclosed as ANSI C and Java.
The first round of evaluations began prior to the first AES candidate conference (AES1)
as NIST reviewed the 21 submitted candidate algorithms. Of the 21 candidate algorithms
received by NIST, 15 met the minimum requirements for acceptance and were included in AES1
(Roback & Dworkin, 1999). The first AES candidate conference, AES1, took place in August of
1998. The conference was primarily informational to prepare the community to respond to the
candidates and conduct independent evaluations. The author(s) of each algorithm presented their
candidate and answered initial questions. A discrepancy on the stated goal for longevity of the
algorithm exists in the literature. The AES candidate report states “first twenty years of the
twenty first century” (Baudron et at., 1999, p. 1). The conference report states “at least thirty
years” (Roback & Dworkin, 1999, p. 98). Regardless, the design was intended to exceed the
lifespan of DES.
After the first conference, the community evaluated the candidate algorithms and
evaluation platforms in preparation for the second conference. Although the initial choice of
platforms, ANSI C and JAVA, required some algorithms to be optimized for different
endianness, NIST, along with several independent groups, began the performance comparisons
while allowing authors to submit optimized implementations. Other considerations between
conferences included initial cryptanalysis, security provided, key schedule, simplicity,
trustworthiness, and hardware implementations (Baudron et at., 1999).
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The second AES conference (AES2) took place in March 1999. It focused on the public
comments pertaining to the candidate algorithms and the initial NIST evaluations. By the end of
AES2, the five algorithms that would become the finalists, Rijndael, RC6, Twofish, MARS, and
Serpent, stood above the rest of the competition to the attendees (NIST, 1999a). A month after
AES2, the first round of evaluations ended and the second round began. NIST announced the
finalists in the summer of 1999 allowing the community to focus their efforts onto the remaining
five candidate algorithms for the final AES conference the following year.
The third and final AES conference (AES3) took place in April 2000. It included FPGA,
platform-specific, and ASIC implementations in addition to more performance comparisons,
preliminary cryptanalysis, and an initial consideration of the future resiliency of AES. Schneier
and Whiting (2000) contributed a series of extensive benchmarks on a variety of platforms for
each AES candidate for each key length and each component – key setup, encrypt, and decrypt.
They concluded that the performance on different platforms varied greatly by algorithm and that
there was no clear best performing algorithm on all platforms tested, so NIST would have to
prioritize the platforms to create an order for the performance category. In 2000, Johnson
evaluated the future resiliency of AES for extended long-term use. Johnson concluded that
selecting a single algorithm for AES could present issues transitioning if it became vulnerable. A
month after AES3, the round two evaluation comment window closed giving NIST about four
months to review the research and select the winning candidate algorithm.
Announcing the Advanced Encryption Standard
In October of 2000, NIST announced the selection of the Rijndael algorithm as AES for
its simplicity, performance, and efficiency. By November 2001, the federal government
completed validation and adopted AES as the federal information processing standard (FIPS)
publication 197 (NIST, 2001). FIPS 197 included the detailed specifications, implementation
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instructions, examples, and pseudo code to allow the industry and government entities to begin
use of the new standard. The Rijndael algorithm, and consequently AES, consists of three
intrinsic components: key expansion, encryption, and decryption. Key expansion increases the
size of the key so that each round of the algorithm uses a different subkey. The key lengths 128-,
192-, and 256-bit use 10-, 12-, and 14-rounds of internal operations respectively (NIST, 2001).
AES uses two-dimensional arrays of bytes, known as “states” for the internal operations of the
algorithm.
Each round consists of a non-linear transformation, two linear transformations, and keybased transformation. The round begins by using a substitution box or s-box to conduct a nonlinear transformation of the state. The substitution is followed by two linear transformations
involving shifting of rows and mixing of columns. The round completes with a bitwise
exclusive-OR of the round key and the state. The algorithm repeats the round as necessary based
on the key length. Decryption is intuitively the inverse of encryption. Key expansion involves a
rotation, a substitution, and a series of exclusive-ORs. Each of the components add strength
against cryptographic attacks to the algorithm.
With the new standard published, several organizations provided reviews of the selection
process. Richards (2001), with the SANS institute, noted the dramatic shift from the secretive
and government influenced process of selecting DES to the process of selecting AES. Unlike the
like DES process, NIST held an open, international competition to select AES. The origins of
winning Rijndael algorithm demonstrated the paradigm shift. Rijndael was developed by two
well-respected cryptographers, Joan Daemen and Vincent Rijmen, of Belgium. The departure
from a standard of government origin or government involvement helped improve industry
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confidence and willingness to adopt the standard in addition to reducing the concerns of a
trapdoor or preexisting cryptographic shortcuts.
Another summary of the development included robust reduced-round attack information
for all of the finalists. The evaluation of attacks against reduced-round implementations provided
a fair comparison to assess the margin of security provided by each candidate. The margin of
security, or safety margin, is the distance between the number of rounds of operations that could
be feasibly broken and the number of rounds proposed for AES. While some candidates favored
performance, others favored security at the expense of performance. This imbalance in the
candidates made the reduced-round attack feasibility an especially important measure of the
margin of security provided by each candidate. The summary concluded that Rijndael had an
adequate margin of security with the best overall performance and flexibility (Nechvatal et al.,
2001).
Burr (2003) authored the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) review
of the AES selection process. He provided the first look at attack feasibility in addition to a
comprehensive review of the process and algorithm, including the modes of operation. Citing
Moore’s law (Moore, 1965), Burr estimated that the 128-bit AES would be as secure as an 80-bit
key was in 2003, extending until 2066 (Burr, 2003). The modes of AES, which are common to
block ciphers, including DES, were electronic code book (ECB), cipher block chain (CBC),
cipher feedback (CFB), and output feedback (OFB). NIST added the counter mode (CTR) for
AES which improves upon the security of parallelizable modes. The modes define how the
algorithm is used and have their own body of knowledge. The modes are important as applied to
all block ciphers, but are a separate topic outside of the primary field of AES cryptography.
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The transition from DES to AES was a complex process. Attacks against DES were far
into the realm of feasibility before AES was announced and use of DES continued for several
years. The continued use of the previous standard serves as evidence of the transition time. The
NIST issued DES transition plan in 2005 set a final transition period of two years for all federal
agencies to transition to TDEA or AES as the standard allowing DES to be formally withdrawn.
Additionally, the IETF security warning in 2006 focused on continued use of DES by the
commercial sector (Kelley, 2006). Common reasons for continued use included backward
compatibility, performance, and ignorance. The public warning sought to address the ignorance
component, while additionally making a strong argument against continued use for the other two
reasons. Although, this gap in security during the transition from DES to AES was concerning,
NIST addressed the concern better for AES.
NIST continues to maintain awareness and responsibility for AES. Approximately every
five years, NIST releases a special publication that contains recommendations and requirements
for algorithm and key-length use. NIST conducted its most recent review in 2015. The review
found all key lengths of AES acceptable for use until the next assessment (Barker & Roginsky,
2015). Based on the verbiage for phasing out other algorithms, when attacks against a key length
are approaching feasibility, NIST will include a recommendation to phase out during the next
five-year period. When key lengths or algorithms no longer provide security, NIST marks them
as legacy use, indicating nothing new can be encrypted using the key length or algorithm; the
proposed retirement candidate may only be used to decrypt legacy data.
Cryptanalysis of the Advanced Encryption Standard
AES has been a central topic of the cryptographic community since its announcement.
Cryptanalysis assesses the strength of the algorithm, confirming the margin of security, through
“attacking”. These cryptographic attacks emulate an adversary with the goal of learning the
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secret key or otherwise gaining access to the plaintext contained in the ciphertext. Attacking the
cipher is generally the most complicated means of access. Attacking the cipher could be
described as gaining access to a locker by guessing the right combination rather than unscrewing
a vulnerable external hinge. Vectors outside of the cipher usually present significantly easier
means of access. Despite the easier modes of access, researching cryptographic attacks ensures
that the component, which is most often assumed secure, remains true to the assumption.
Cryptographic attacks have a few universal components. Requirements for data, compute,
and memory are common. Data refers to the size of the ciphertext in either bits or in blocks.
Attacks range from requiring a block worth of data to nearly the size of the brute force key
space. Data may include specific data or pairs. Some attacks require known- or chosen-plaintext
pairs. These pairs involve a block of the ciphertext that corresponds to a known or chosen
plaintext. Every attack, including brute force, requires some way to verify the output is as
expected as any number of candidate keys may appear to produce an expected result. This effect
is more prominent for the smaller the ciphertext.
Compute, also known as workload, is the number of operations required to complete the
attack. For cryptographic attacks against AES, the internal rounds vary be key length: 10 rounds
for 128-bit, 12 for 192-bit, and 14 for 256-bit keys. These rounds are a component of complexity.
Additionally, key setup operations vary by key length. Reduced round implementations are also
analyzed as a means to measure the margin of security. Because the rounds may not match the
specified key length for these assessments, the key length and the number of rounds are
independent factors of the compute component of attacks against AES. Compute is usually
measured in the number of full AES operations based on the key size and rounds.
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Memory refers to the amount of storage, not necessarily random-access memory (RAM),
which an attack requires. Some attacks require very little memory to conduct, just enough to
store candidate keys while they are tested. Others use precompute to produce large structures that
require significant memory to reduce the final compute requirements. Aside from the common
components, data, compute, and memory, AES has the additional components of key length and
rounds. However, some categories of attacks against AES have additional, special requirements.
Cryptographic attacks fall into several categories. At the highest level, these attacks either
rely on special conditions about the situation or they do not. Attacks that do not rely on special
conditions are general purpose and apply to the cipher operating in any condition. Attacks in this
category that improve upon the compute of brute force are considered breaks. Attacks that do
rely on special conditions are not breaks of the algorithm because they rely on conditions outside
of the algorithm. The conditions include some form of physical access, access to the input and
output of the cipher, related keys, or implementation nuances. Most attacks require some
understanding of the plain text. Without the ability to verify the plaintext, determining the
validity of a candidate key is not possible. For example, if a fully random block was encrypted,
decrypting with the incorrect keys and the correct key would produce similarly random outputs.
However, if the plaintext is known to contain ASCII text, the key validation may simply consist
of checking for outputs that contain ASCII characters. These checks are usually parallelizable
and are not always included in the compute component.
General Attacks
All traditional, non-quantum encryption is subject to the simpliest of attacks: brute force.
While simple conceptually, it is generally the worst case in terms of compute as it forms a
starting point for future cryptographic efforts to improve upon. Although far from feasible,
Rijndael was subject to brute force from its inception. As seen with DES, the key length is the
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mitigating factor for this attack. The key lengths of 128-, 192-, and 256-bit for AES were
determined before any algorithms were submitted. Almost 20 years later, even the 128-bit
keylength successfully places brute force out of the range of feasibility. Brute force is data
agnostic. It does not require large samples or pairs of ciphertext and plaintext; as long as enough
is known about the plaintext to test if a decryption attempt was successful with a given key,
nothing else is needed besides an immense amount of compute, time, or both.
Table 2
General attacks
Complexity
Attack
Brute
Force

Biclique

Key(s)

Rounds

Data

Compute

Memory

Year

Trivial

1998

28

2011

2128

128

10

192

12

256

14

128

10

288

2126.1

192

12

280

2189.7

256

14

240

2254.4

Trivial

2192
2256

Note. Derived from Bogdanov, Khovratovich, & Rechberger (2011) and Burr (2003).

Aside from brute force, the only known general attack against AES is biclique
cryptanalysis. Even in its worst-case performance it improves on brute force by a factor of three
to five times depending on key length (Bogdanov, Khovratovich, & Rechberger, 2011). An
algorithm is considered broken if any attack, which does not require prerequisite assumptions, is
faster in terms of compute than brute force (Burr, 2003). The biclique cryptanalysis attack is the
only known break of AES (Bogdanov et al., 2011). While it is a ground breaking attack, it has
generally infeasible data requirements and is not a large enough improvement on compute to be
feasible. Future improvements upon the data and compute components of this attack method may
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represent a formidable threat to the continued use of AES; however, no improvements have been
published to date. Table 2 depicts the general attacks against AES, their key lengths, rounds,
complexity, and the year they were introduced to the body of knowledge.
Partial-Implementation Attacks
Attacks against partial implementations help validate the margin of security provided by
the algorithm. Internally, AES repeats the substitution, transformations, and mixing steps for a
given number of rounds based on the key length. For AES, the rounds are 10, 12, and 14 for the
given keys lengths of 128-, 192-, and 256-bit respectively. The security margin is the gap
between the highest-round, feasible attack and the rounds required by the algorithm. If the gap is
too narrow, a single innovative shortcut could result in a feasible attack, which would render the
algorithm obselete. In practice, partial implementations are rare because they lack security and
consequently lack approval for use in most situations, but dispite the drawbacks, are sometimes
used to implement the internals of stream ciphers (Bouillaguet et al., 2012).
Even before NIST selected the Rijndael algorithm as a finalist for AES, its authors, Joan
Daemen and Vincent Rijmen, considered known cryptographic methods and Rijndael’s strength
against those techniques. The authors asserted that the full implementations for each key length
were secure from known cryptographic methods, but partial implementations were expectedly
vulnerable. They found feasible attacks for all key lengths when only four or five rounds were
used and a generally infeasible attack, requiring 272 operations, with six rounds (Daemen &
Rijmen, 1999). The required round lengths were purposefully selected for their balance of
performance and acceptable margins of security.
Partial implementation attacks often rely on other assumptions including related keys or
the ability to manipulate or knowedge of the plaintext. Table 3 contains notable partial
implementation attacks regardless of their other dependencies. The following sections omit these
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attacks to prevent overlap. Although the attack relies on related keys, which makes it inpractical,
the related-key boomerang attack presented by Biryukov and Khovratovich in 2010 is not only in
the feasible range but is also only one round short of a full implementation. A single
improvement in the attack technique could pose a feasible, albeit still costly threat to AES use in
related key environments.
Table 3
Partial-implementation attacks

Attack

Key(s)

Truncated
Differential

All

Partial Sums
(ChosenPlaintext)

128
192
256
256

Rounds
4
5
6
6
7
7
8
8
9

Related-Key
ChosenPlaintext

256

9

Data
9

2
211
232
232
2128 – 2119
2128 – 2119
2128 – 2119
2128 – 2119
285
285

Complexity
Compute
29
240
272
244
2120
2120
2188
2204
2226
2224

Memory

264
264
264
232

Year
1999
1999
1999
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000

232

2000

Trivial
Trivial
232
232

7
2115.5
2119
2109
2008
92
186
7
2
2
2157
2004
92.5
250.5
157
7
2
2
2
2004
Related-Key
10
244
245
233
2010
256
70
70
33
Differential
11
2
2
2
2010
256
9
259
2119
242.5
2010
Related-Key
67
135.3
42.5
256
9
2
2
2
2010
Boomerang
256
13
276
276
276
2010
Note. Derived from Nechvatal, et al. (2000), Phan (2004), Ferguson, et al. (2000),
Biryukov & Khovratovich (2010), and Soleimany, Sharifi & Aref (2010).
Key Attacks
Impossible
Differential

128
192
256

Key attacks generally rely relationships between keys but may also refer to attacks that
exploit the key schedule. Frequently it is the properties of the key schedule that enable the
observation of related keys to result in key recovery. For every criticism of AES, a solution is
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presented. Several different modifications have been proposed to strengthen the key schedule, as
one of the most criticized components of AES and the foundation for many related key attacks.
Early proposals did not always uphold the requirement for hardware implementations, for
example, by increasing the key expansion by adding rounds of AES, they made the key schedule
stronger and importantly irreversible, but not hardware implementation compatible (Choy,
Zhang, Khoo, Henricksen, & Poschmann, 2011). Later proposals improved security at little cost
to efficiency, while remaining hardware implementation compatible.
Although many of the partial implementation attacks in Table 3 rely on related keys,
these attacks also extend to full implementations found in Table 4. Related-key attacks rely on a
number of related keys, an attack requiring the observation of a few keys, like the boomerang
attack in Table 4, is much less practical than the attack requiring 235 related keys (RKs). The
tradeoff in terms of practicality and the other components of complexity are common throughout
the attack types, but especially important here where an attack with the complexity of the relatedkey differential would be devastating without the requirement for the impractical number of
related keys.
Table 4
Key attacks
Attack

Key(s)

Rounds

Complexity
Year
RKs Data
Compute
Memory
Related-Key Boomerang
256
14
4
2119
2119
277
2009
35
96
96
Related-Key Differential
256
14
2
2
2
265
2009
Note. Derived from Biryukov & Khovratovich (2009); Biryukov, Khovratovich & Nikolić
(2009)
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Plaintext Attacks
Plaintext attacks rely on access to known or chosen plaintext in addition to the cipher
text. Many other attacks, including brute force, require at least some limited information about
the plaintext, encoding for example, to allow trial decryptions to be evaluated. With known
plaintext attacks, key recovery relies on many known pairs of plaintext and ciphertext. Chosen
plaintext attacks extend this approach by requiring the attacker to be able to encrypt arbitrary
plaintext and observe the resulting ciphertext. Although several of the partial implementation
attacks in Table 3 require chosen plaintexts, most AES modes are, by design, resistant to this
type of attack. Since these attacks were known even prior to attacks becoming feasible against
DES, they were appropriately considered during the AES selection process (Baudron et al., 1999;
Biham & Shamir, 1993).
Side-Channel Attacks
Side-channel attacks employ unique approachs to defeat cryptosystems. They utilize
various forms of leaked information or implementation weaknesses instead of directly attacking
the cryptographic algorith (Alghazzawi, Hasan, & Trigui, 2014). The exploited components
include physical properties such as timing, power consumption, noise, or radiation. Generally,
these attacks are simultaneously the most feasible and the least practical (Zhou & Feng, 2005).
The feasibility stems from the avoidance of the cryptosystem and focus on the other available
channels. The impracticality is based on the high degree of access to the system that measuring
the precise timing, power draw, or electromagnetic radiation would require (Khan & Mahanta,
2014). Although these attacks avoid the cryptosystem, the usage mode of the cryptosystem has
an impact on the feasibility of power analysis (Jayasinghe, Ragel, Ambrose, Ignjatovic, &
Parameswaran 2014). Table 5 contains several notable side-channel attacks. Unlike the previous
attack categories, every type of side-channel attack requires the exposure of drastically different
52

components of the algorithm. In 2011, Floissac and L'Hyver adapted a differential fault analysis
attack to all key sizes which required generating faults in the key expansion process. Although
the internal states of the key expansion process would be very difficult to access, this attack only
requires a few bytes worth of faults to recover the key. Another approach, collision timing,
requires access to the input, output, and clock of AES ASICs to recover the key. Improvements
on this method made it capable of defeating fault and power analysis protected hardware
implementations (Moradi, Mischke, & Paar, 2013).
Table 5
Side-channel attacks
Attack

Key(s)

Rounds

Differential
Power
Analysis

128

10

Differential
Fault
Analysis

All

All

Access
MicroSecond
Power
Draw
Key
Expansion
Internal
States
ASIC I/O,
Clock

Data

Complexity
Compute

Year

Trivial

Trivial

Trivial

2008

Trivial

Trivial

Trivial

2011

Memory

Collision
All
All
224
Trivial
Trivial
2013
Timing
Trace
Driven
All
All
Cache
Trivial
Trivial
Trivial
2013
Cache
Note. Derived from Yu, Xue-cheng, Zheng-lin, & Yi-cheng (2008); Floissac & L'Hyver
(2011); Moradi, Mischke & Paar (2013); Zhao, et al. (2013).
Performance
Regardless of attack type, AES performance forms some component of the feasibility of
the attack. The simplest attack, brute force, is entirely performance-based. The faster AES
operations can be conducted, the faster the attack can be completed. Other attacks require various
AES operations, but performance is not only a consideration that relates to attacks. It was a
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priority during selection to ensure that AES was usable by the computers of that time. This
section includes the performance considerations during the selection process, AES performance
since selection, and general performance since selection. AES performance since selection
involves the changes to implementations, both hardware and software, that improve upon the
initial performance characteristics of the algorithm. Lastly, general performance pertains to the
state of computing, including innovations in lithography, parallel computing, and architectures.
Another component of performance is the study and application of performance
predictions. This practice involves the identification of system and software factors effecting
performance through the use of benchmark and modeling. Even in its early forms, the design of
representative workloads involved modeling and tuning, which made external validity difficult
(Berry, 1992). The rise of standard benchmark solutions like Linpack and HPL helped address
those difficulties. From those standard platforms, results became consistent enough to use the
benchmark ratios as performance predictors (Gustafson & Todi, 1998).
Predicting performance relies on the modeling of the process. Queuing networks are a
method for modeling steps in a process to predict performance and better design representative
workloads. They use nodes to represent components of a process, which makes them especially
applicable to the understanding of AES performance (Balsamo, Di Marco, Inverardi, & Simeoni,
2004; Menascé, Almeida, & Dowdy, 2004). Using queuing networks, a brute force attack on
AES could be portrayed as a linear network where each node is parallelizable: key expansion,
trial decryption, and result verification. Other attacks require more complex models; however,
nearly all the attacks have some component of AES operations.
AES Performance Considerations during Selection
The performance of the candidate algorithms was a crucial component of the selection
process. Even the announcement requesting candidates mentioned efficiency as a component of
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the evaluation criteria (NIST, 1997). At that time, DES was waning and the rising TDEA
alternative, which simply increased the key by conducting DES multiple times, was very
inefficient (EFF, 1998a; NIST, 1999b). The concern that the next standard be more efficient than
DES was evident during the process by the various performance publications which addressed
this component of the requirements. Furthermore, as technology continued to become more
mobile and miniaturized, NIST appropriately included a variety of microprocessors and other
miniature devices (Burr, 2003).
After the first candidate conference, the performance of the leading 15 candidate
algorithms was measured on a variety of platforms. The study measured not only encryption but
also key setup performance. It provided detailed summaries and comments for each algorithm.
Rijndael, the candidate that eventually became AES, had only positive comments boasting great
performance across all platforms without any incompatibilities or negatively affected platforms
(Schneier et al., 1999). Although performance was not the only design consideration, the
algorithms that became the finalists all performed very well in this initial assessment.
When the five finalists emerged, Schneier and Whiting (2000) conducted an additional
study focused specifically on the performance characteristics of the remaining candidate
algorithms. The study included additional fields, such as comparisons of the minimal secure and
maximally insecure variants of each algorithm, to help delineate the differences in performance
for each algorithm’s round count. The study also included concern that the primary purpose of an
encryption standard, security, might not be as high of a priority as performance. Despite the
concern, all of the finalists had excellent margins of security and the emphasis on performance
would allow industry to better adapt to and implement the new standard. In the end, Rijndael not
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only had very low memory requirements but was also twice as fast as the other finalists
(Nechvatal, et al., 2000).
AES Performance since Selection
AES performance since its selection refers to performance improvements specifically
targeting AES. These performance improvements and optimizations have equal impact on AES
for normal cryptographic use as they do cryptanalysis. Despite having impacts relating to both
normal use and cryptographic attacks, in the literature, these improvements usually focus on just
one component of the performance improvement. This current research draws upon both
categories since improvements in one mean improvements in the other. The drivers for the
improvements primarily focus on hardware, since the algorithm specifications have not changed.
GPUs are mentioned throughout the literature as powerful platforms for cryptography. In
2007, Manavski found that GPU architecture very capable as an accelerator for AES. Both
encryption and decryption saw improvements, which peaked at nearly 20 times faster than the
CPU. This study focused on the CUDA architecture found in Nvidia GPUs. Another more recent
CUDA study saw an increase in performance over CPU by 87 times (Khan et al., 2014). Further
research on GPU-based efficiency and price to performance comparisons followed. Not every
study found the same degree of performance improvements, but helped to validate the capability
of the platform for AES operations (Shao, Chang, & Zhang, 2010). A notable study in 2014
found that the platform agnostic GPU library OpenCL was also capable of significant
improvements (Yuan, He, Gong, & Qiu, 2014). Although all types of GPUs have formidable
AES potential, the implementations are still in software, albeit highly parallelized software.
Perhaps the largest performance improvement was the advent of AES hardware
instruction sets on the CPU. In 2010, the Intel® AES new instructions (AES-NI) brought
hardware implementation to an unprecedented level, increasing performance by more than an
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order of magnitude (Gueron, 2010). AMD, and eventually ARM, have since adopted similar
AES hardware instructions. Because every system has a CPU, this performance improvement
effected a much larger population of platforms. Although this improvement alone made routine
use of AES seamless, it does not pose a direct threat independently. However, this improvement
combined with a large group of systems or a supercomputer might pose a significant as
technology continues to improve. A combination of the massive parallelism of GPUs in the form
of application specific integrated circuits (ASICs) and hardware instructions would produce a
dangerously powerful platform. In the offensive sense, Biryukov and Großschadl theorized that a
GPU-like ASIC would have the throughput of 77.6 Gbit/s (2012).
General Performance since Selection
The general state of computing performance since NIST selected Rijndael as AES in
2001 involves both improvements in the prevalence of technology and improvements in the
capability of technology. As mentioned in the introduction, the sheer size of the connected world
is the first major factor. Based on stats from the International Telecommunication Union, the
World Bank, and the United Nations, nearly of half of the world’s population uses the Internet
(Internet Live Stats, 2018). Up from less than one percent in 1995, the increase in the last two
decades is enormous. While the introduction and assumptions and biases sections focused on the
increased need for protecting what has become a critical component of society, the increase also
has a performance implication: the amount of available processing power has risen at the same
alarming rate as the world has adopted connected technology. This increase is compounded by
the actual evolutionary and revolutionary improvements in technology that follow.
The improvements in the capability of technology have two components, evolutionary
and revolutionary changes. When AES was selected, Moore’s Law was the best approach for
estimating the future performance of computing systems. It related the cost per component and
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the number of components per integrated circuit with time (Moore, 1965). For decades,
performance has closely aligned with this law. However, revolutionary changes in technology
have separated performance from sheer number of components, or in most cases, transistors.
Production scale, lithography, is an example of evolutionary changes. From 350-nanometer
manufacturing scale in the mid-1990s to the 14-nanometers that is mainstream today, this change
accounts for significant computing performance capability (Intel, 2018).
Evolutionary improvements in CPU and GPU design scale, lithography, have allowed for
higher clock rates and respectively greater compute potential. However, these changes faced a
variety of limiting factors, which led to the first revolutionary change, multicore CPUs.
Multicore CPUs allowed a departure from the clock rate and instructions being the sole
determining factor of a CPU’s performance. Other changes in the manufacturing field, including
tri-gate transistors, allowed more cores on each socket, reduced heat, and enabled higher clock
speeds. All these innovations, which improved upon general performance, also improved AES
performance and resultantly enhanced attack feasibility.
Attack Feasibility
Although feasibility is a component of every published attack, the purely attack
feasibility literature is limited. The earliest estimation of AES attack feasibility cites Moore’s
Law and states that the first key length, 128-bit, should endure for around six decades as secure
as an 80-bit key was in 2003 (Burr, 2003). In 2003, an 80-bit key was undeniably secure. Asides
from the periodic review for usability, transitioning from DES and general AES research seemed
to take precedence over AES attack feasibility. Given the lifespan of DES and the significantly
improved key lengths of AES, the focus on transition, rather than immediate consideration of
AES key lengths was appropriate.
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Biryukov and Großschädl (2012) theorized an attack platform capable of completing
attacks of the 2100 compute complexity in feasible time using GPU-like, special-purpose
hardware. Although their work was published in 2012, it referenced 2010 technology. The attack
referenced was the partial implementation attack using related keys with 299.5 compute
complexity (Biryukov & Khovratovich, 2010). Although this attack has assumptions and is based
on a partial implementation, an improved method or simply time, may make their trillion US
dollar theoretical system much more realistic in the near future.
Another attack feasibility study focused on the massive increase in the number of
systems, in particular, mobile devices. It followed a similar framework as Distributed.net used to
attack DES: just 10,000 commodity devices defeated DES only 20 years after its selection
(Curtin & Dolske, 1998). Marculescu (2014) concluded that a trillion mobile devices could
search 275 keys per year. This assessment, places even the shortest AES key length of 128-bit far
out of reach. These assessments are expected to continue to indicate that attacks are infeasible for
years, but are still important for staying ahead of the necessary transition time. Furthermore, as
these assessments indicate a closing margin of security, similar to the early 1990s assessments of
DES, moving to the higher key variants of AES will be appropriate.
Future technologies such as quantum computing pose a great threat to encryption
technologies, just as the aforementioned innovative technologies that increased the rate of
compute beyond the rate that was initially projected. The massive revolutionary change that
widespread or large-scale quantum computing will bring to the world will also have a great
impact on cryptography. Algorithms that rely on factoring will be greatly reduced in attack
complexity by Shor’s algorithm (Bernstein et al., 2009). The reduction is so great that these
methods will be rendered immediately and completely obsolete. Algorithms like AES do not rely
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on factoring. However, Gover’s algorithm still provides reduction in complexity, but not enough
to immediately defeat the algorithm.
Conceptual Framework
The foundation for this research is the modern cryptographic principle of cryptanalysis.
Combined with the lessons learned by the rise and fall of the previous standard, DES, the
cryptographic community, led by NIST, selected the Rijndael algorithm as the new encryption
standard. Lessons including key length, differential cryptanalysis, and transition time led this
research to the gap addressed by this study. Despite attack feasibility literature emerging the in
early 1990s, the feasibility of conducting a brute force attack against DES was not adequately
tracked, calculated, or projected when it became evident that DES was no longer secure.
Although NIST assesses AES periodically for five-year continued use, a practical, potentially
real-time approach to determining the attack potential, is absent from the body of knowledge.
As the next generation standard, AES is cryptographically sound. Even before final
selection, the candidates underwent extensive cryptographic and performance testing. AES is
approaching its initial design time of 20 years, although initial projections of the shortest key
length enduring for six decades, the world computing power has undergone massive change
since AES took the stage. Changes, including multicore, multithreading, and AES hardware
instructions, directly impact the CPU portion of processing power addressed in this study. To
prevent these changes from compounding into a similar insecure situation that happened with
DES, this research sought to determine the ratio between a widely available performance
standard, FLOPS, and the AES operations, to potentially allow projections about the endurance
of the standard and attack feasibility to accurately determine when key lengths need to be
abandoned or a new standard is required.

60

Summary of Literature Review
This chapter detailed the literature surrounding the topic of AES attack feasibility. It
included the foundation of the modern cryptographic era as the reason for open cryptographic
standards and the paramount concept of cryptanalysis as the means of validating the security
provided by cryptosystems. It advanced through the previous standard, DES, as the context for
the selection of the current standard, AES, and demonstrated the study’s concern regarding the
potential for attacks to become feasible sooner than initially projected. It outlined the selection
process and criteria for selection that eventually led to AES becoming the new standard.
The chapter review delved into the various forms of cryptanalysis conducted throughout
the literature to validate the security provided by AES. It preceded to detailed explanations of the
various attack types and tables depicting each attack with its associated performance data. It
related the fields of attack feasibility and performance, demonstrating the intertwined nature of
these fields, and identifying the gap which this research sought to fill. It concluded with the
conceptual framework, which connected all of these categories of literature in the body of
knowledge to form a foundation for the research questions. Chapter 3 will build upon this
foundation to detail the method for the study. The method stems from the conceptual framework
to answer the research questions.
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CHAPTER THREE
This chapter presents the methods used to conduct the study. It begins by reviewing the
research traditions from the body of knowledge that align with the conceptual framework. It
continues to provide a review of the research questions and their associated hypotheses. The
research design follows, which outlines the nature of the study and the approach used for
collection, measurement, and analysis of the data. The research design includes the population
and sampling information, in addition to the reasons why the sample was selected. This chapter
also contains the detailed reasoning for the development of the collection mechanism and the
selection of the survey instruments contained within the collection design. It concludes with
specific information about the implementation of the collection design, with full code available
in the appendices. The inclusion of fully detailed information and code allows the study to be
repeated in the future.
Research Tradition(s)
This study contained research traditions from several fields. Benchmarks and the use of
representative workloads are well established in the performance engineering field. The use of
these procedures in the cryptography field for attack feasibility estimations is less common. In
the case of DES, more detailed studies about attack feasibility and complexity were published as
attacks reached the feasible point. Although every cryptographic attack publication briefly
mentions feasibility, complexity, or performance, the more accurate techniques and dedicated
research are less common. When studies do approach attack feasibility, they generally do so in
one of two ways: they use a single or very limited set of hardware configurations, or they use
theoretical, application-specific systems.
Considering attack feasibility as a form of validating the security provided by a
cryptographic algorithm is a foundational concept of the modern cryptographic era. This concept
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stems from Kerchkhoffs’ Cryptographie Militaire, which was published in 1893 (Kahn, 1996).
Kerckhoffs recognized the increased emergence of cryptosystems for military use and that the
transformation of communication brought on by the telegraph would require new considerations
for cryptography. One of these considerations was the need to verify the security provided by a
cryptosystem. Kerckhoffs was justly critical of trends in cryptography at the time as the
cryptographic techniques not only lacked validation but had not kept up with the pace of
technology. Due to these concerns, Kerckhoffs introduced cryptanalysis in his literary work as a
necessity to understand the security of a cryptosystem (Singh, 2000).
Cryptanalysis was among the considerations for DES, the predecessor to AES, when it
emerged in the 1970s. The expected feasibility of attacks was assessed and found acceptable at
that time. By 1993, however, the concern of the key length and the potential attack complexity
reduction of differential cryptanalysis entered the literature (Biham & Shamir, 1993). In 1997,
RSA Laboratories launched a cryptographic challenge to assess the security of currently in use
encryption algorithms; DES was among them. The first success against DES was a distributed
group using brute force that peaked around 14,000 personal computers (Curtin & Dolske, 1998).
After 20 years as the workhorse of the cryptography, DES was now insecure; its 56-bit key was
its downfall. Although the AES key lengths solved much of the problem with DES, at 128-, 192-,
and 256-bit, assessments of key length endurance were part of the initial literature after selection.
Cryptanalysis and attack feasibility were even more present during the selection process
for AES from 1997 to 2001. The cryptanalysis included the application of all known methods
against each of the candidates, in addition to considerations for partial round implementations
and their margin of security from feasible attacks (Ferguson et al., 2000). Attack feasibility
considerations occurred throughout the process as well. The multiple, long key lengths were
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designed to prevent the failures of DES. The early estimate for the shortest key length of AES,
approximately 60 years, was made shortly after the selection (Burr, 2003).
Biryukov and Großschädl considered attack feasibility in 2012 using a theoretical,
special-purpose approach based on the lithography and available technology in 2010. They
concluded that a one trillion US dollar system built with GPU-like special purpose processors
could complete an attack against AES in a year. The results of this current research may allow
similar estimation about the number or cost of modern, general-purpose CPUs completing the
same attack. Consequently, using this study as a template for a study of GPUs or GPU-like
ASICs would expectedly yield closer to feasible results.
The study of performance and the identification of factors effecting performance,
including the appropriate tuning, are integral to the performance component of this research.
Even early benchmark studies had difficulty with external validity and tuning (Berry, 1992).
Using one benchmark to predict the performance of another is a component of this study, which
Gustafson and Todi used to rank a variety of benchmarks in 1998. Benchmarks and
representative workloads stem from system planning, but have an important role in AES
performance prediction and the design of the collection mechanism.
This study aimed to build upon these traditions. The consideration of attack feasibility
and the inclusion of known attacks fulfils the component of cryptanalysis by testing the security
provided by the AES algorithm. The practicality of the DES challenges approach is present in the
benchmarking and use of general-purpose hardware. Despite the infeasibility of attacks, the
theoretical component is present in the potential applications of the results. Since distributed and
general-purpose hardware-based attacks are expectedly far from feasible, the contribution may
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help realign the initial key-length durability estimations with the actual progression of
technology in the last 20 years.
Research Questions and Hypotheses
R1: How correlated are the results of traditional benchmarks and AES benchmarks
conducted on systems in the sample population?
H00: No statistically significant correlations exist between traditional benchmarks and
AES benchmarks conducted on systems in the sample population.
H0A: Statistically significant correlations exist between traditional benchmarks and AES
benchmarks conducted on systems in the sample population.
R2: How do the hardware configurations of systems in the sample population effect the
level of correlation between traditional benchmarks and AES benchmarks?
H10: The AES hardware instructions component of the hardware configurations of
systems in the sample population has no statistically significant effects on the level of correlation
between traditional benchmarks and AES benchmarks.
H1A: The AES hardware instructions component of the hardware configurations of
systems in the sample population has statistically significant effects on the level of correlation
between traditional benchmarks and AES benchmarks.
H20: The processor type component of the hardware configurations of systems in the
sample population has no statistically significant effects on the level of correlation between
traditional benchmarks and AES benchmarks.
H2A: The processor type component of the hardware configurations of systems in the
sample population has statistically significant effects on the level of correlation between
traditional benchmarks and AES benchmarks.

65

H30: The memory component of the hardware configurations of systems in the sample
population has no statistically significant effects on the level of correlation between traditional
benchmarks and AES benchmarks.
H3A: The memory component of the hardware configurations of systems in the sample
population has statistically significant effects on the level of correlation between traditional
benchmarks and AES benchmarks.
Research Design
This study was quantitative in nature. It involved gathering of hardware information and
benchmarks from a variety of systems using two established instruments from the literature.
These instruments were included in a robust, highly-automated collection design to allow for the
sampling to include the necessary diversity of configurations to purposefully represent the
variety of systems in the population. Since the population was modern systems, human
involvement was limited to the role of facilitators. Figure 4 depicts a simplification of the
research design, instrumentation, and collection procedure.

Figure 4. Simple Design by Daniel S. Hawthorne. Copyright 2018
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Population and Sample
The population for this research involved the majority of modern computers, which are
referred to as systems in this study that are able to conduct both floating point operations and
AES operations. These systems are found almost everywhere and include the vast majority of
laptops, desktops, and servers in use today. The systems are general-purpose and contain central
processing units (CPUs) based on the x86_64 instruction set. Both AMD and Intel have used the
x86_64 instruction set for central processing units (CPUs) since 2004 (AMD, 2018; Intel, 2018).
Although CPUs are found almost everywhere, they are only one component of the global
computing power. However, CPUs were the only component of global compute included in this
research because the differences in architectures and instruction sets require specially tailored
benchmarks and would be best suited for follow-on studies.
The population, and resultantly the sample, deliberately excluded four categories of
computing platforms. The first two are ARM-based processor and GPUs. These robust platforms
are able to conduct many types of operations, including floating point and AES, but the
differences in benchmark techniques would have required separate scripts and introduced a layer
of complexity and uncertainty to this study. The last two are field programmable gate arrays
(FPGAs) and application specific integrated circuits (ASICs). FPGAs perform one specific task
but may be reprogrammed to do another. ASICs possess remarkable performance for single tasks
as each is designed for only one type of operation. The latter two cannot conduct both floating
point operations and AES operations and were therefore excluded. Although they could not
conduct both of the necessary operations for this study, these systems excel at performing AES
and could pose the greatest threat to its continued use, as they did with DES and as Biryukov and
Großschädl in 2012 more recently hypothesized (EFF, 1998b).
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The sample was a subset of the population with four criteria for inclusion. The x86_64
instruction set was given as a condition of the population. The ability to boot to a USB device
and a wired network connection to the Internet were requirements for inclusion based on the
research design. Booting to the same operating system on a USB device reduced the variance of
the results by eliminating the components of differences between operating systems, background
services, and running programs. The network connection was necessary for the automatic
submission of the results. To simplify the task of the facilitators, the collection required a wired
network connection, as the task of establishing wireless connectivity without a desktop
environment was a daunting for many users.
Sampling Procedure
The sampling procedure used by this study was unique. Unlike many other forms of
research, the subjects of this study were computer systems. The components of interest in the
study were the configuration of the hardware and performance of those systems. The hardware
configurations of the same make and model generally have very little variability in performance.
Aside from a few exceptions, which the study accounted for in the reliability section, computer
systems in general have negligible differences in performance over time. The research questions
and non-experimental approach also lent to the uniqueness of the sampling procedure. The study
sought to characterize the performance of systems across a variety of hardware configurations.
The study did not attempt to make inferences about the distribution of hardware configurations
for systems in the entire population. These initial conditions ruled out random sampling or the
need to try to collect representative numbers of hardware configurations. Instead, purposive
sampling was used to collect a variety of hardware configurations.
This study utilized purposive sampling. Purposive sampling is a nonprobability sampling
method where subjects are selected because they are typical or diverse (Vogt, 2007). For this
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study, the exact sample size for each research question was determined during the data collection
process. The sampling requirements for R1 and R2 were notably different. R1 is straight
forward; it required a number of results from discrete systems. It did not require a set variety of
systems, as long as the collected data was from discrete systems, in other words, not from the
same computer. Separate systems of the same make, model, and configuration were still a valid
inclusion as the results reinforced the reliability of the collection instruments and helped identify
anomalies. The sampling requirements for R2 were more complex.
The sampling for R2 required a variety of hardware configurations. The variations were
the descriptive independent variables indicated by H1, H2, and H3: AES instructions, processor,
and memory respectively. It was possible that a determination on H1 might not be possible,
given the prevalence of AES hardware instructions, which Intel introduced in 2010, but are now
found on most CPUs (Gueron, 2010). However, if a determination was possible, it was expected
that the presence or absence of AES instructions would have a statistically significant impact on
the results. The target for completion of the collection phase was reaching an adequate variety of
system configurations to make determinations on H2 and H3. The instrumentation and collection
design enabled simple expansion of the facilitator audience as necessary to reach the target
sample variety.
Instrumentation
The instrumentation and collection design expand the details of the simple design,
included in Figure 4. This section describes in detail each of the elements depicted in Figure 5.
At the core, the instruments were the CryptSetup and high performance Linpack (HPL)
benchmark utilities, which were installed on the ArchISO Linux and executed by the collection
script. However, the instrumentation and collection design were a more detailed process, which
included the distribution, delivery, execution, and results collection of those benchmark
69

instruments. This section was organized in order of execution through a single repetition of the
instrumentation and collection design, although, the development order was the opposite. The
instrumentation and collection design process consisted of three scripts, two configuration files,
and several other tasks. All of these elements are included in Figure 5, explained in this section,
and the full code included in the appendices.

Figure 5. Instrumentation and Collection Design
The process began with the solicitation of interest from potential facilitators. Those that
chose to participate received a prepared USB drive to use as a boot device for their system or
systems. The drive contained a specifically remastered ArchISO Linux and the collection script.

70

Once booted, the script ran the aforementioned benchmarks, gathered system information, and
submited the results to the collection server. The collection server contained the second script,
which wrote those results to a file. Finally, a third script was combined with secure copy (SCP)
to retrieve the results and organize the data.
Interest Email, Facilitator Site, and Facilitators
Upon completion of the Intuitional Review Board and receipt of approval to begin
collection, the process began with the distribution of the facilitator interest email to professional
colleagues and personal acquaintances who expressed interest in the research. The possibility for
expansion of the audience remained until the completion of the preliminary data analysis. If
necessary, the expansion would have begun by including computer industry contacts and posting
the contents of the research interest email on various security and research forums. The email
included a brief synopsis of the research and a link to the facilitator site where interested
recipients could find more information and sign up to help facilitate.
The facilitator site (Appendix E) was a Google survey site that provided additional
information about the research and collected some basic information from the facilitators. The
upfront information included the goal of projecting attack feasibility, the benchmark pairs to be
collected, and the limit of the collection – not accessing any other storage devices or gathering
personal information. Following the initial information, the site included a link to the source
code of the collection script to allow every facilitator to review, understand, and audit the design
to their liking. The specific requirements of an x86_64 processor, the ability to boot to USB, and
a wired Internet collection were included and explained to help ensure facilitators had systems
that met the criteria for testing.
Following the above information, the facilitator site collected the name, email, and
method to receive the USB drive from interested facilitators. Further fields including an option to
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be recognized in the publication, phone number, and comments were included but completely
optional. Additionally, if the facilitator elected to receive the USB drive by mail, the facilitator
had to include a physical mailing address. If the facilitator chose the more advanced option to
download the ISO, the final section contained additional instructions for writing the ISO file to a
USB drive and an optional device ID field for facilitators that wanted to receive recognition. As
Google surveys were submitted, the collection media was prepared and shipped or delivered
based on the chosen method.
Live Linux, Collection Script, and USB Drives
Booting facilitator systems to a common operating system eliminated the variability of
the operating system, background processes, and services. Arch Linux, a stable and lightweight
distribution with a robust user repository containing the tools needed for this research was an
appropriate foundation. As one of the lightest distributions, it had nothing extra to slow down the
benchmarks while simultaneously leveling the operating system tasks for every sample system in
the study. The initial configuration of Arch Linux was a persistent USB installation of the
operating system. However, several compatibility issues arose when testing on platforms with
differences, such as CPU type, from the platform upon which the persistent USB installation was
built. The ArchISO live USB variant of Arch Linux was free of the aforementioned compatibility
issues and served as a consistent platform across a variety of hardware types. Although
remastering ArchISO to include the packages for this study was much more involved than simply
installing them on a persistent install, the read only file system of the resulting remastered ISO
helped reduce the chance of facilitator introduced errors.
Manjaro Linux, a user-friendly Arch-based distribution, was used as a development
platform and for the initial testing environment for the benchmark script. As an Arch-based
Linux distribution, Manjaro's environmental similarities with ArchISO and robust toolset made it
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a sound choice for not only development but the remastering process of ArchISO. Remastering
ArchISO, which typically contains the Arch installer and other simple packages for use as a live
Linux implementation, allowed for the inclusion of the collection script, benchmark instruments,
and all the required dependencies in the read only ArchISO. In addition to the development
platform, three other systems were used as testing platforms to reduce the possibility of
compatibility issues. Table 6 depicts the five test platforms in total, including a virtual machine,
which were used for developing the benchmark script to ensure that the scripts functioned as
expected in a variety of environments.
Table 6
Testing platforms
CPU
Type

Make/Model

Cores

Threads

Memory

AES NI

Laptop

Intel i5-4200M

2

4

4 GB

True

Virtual Machine

Intel i5-4200M*

1*

1*

1 GB

True

Desktop

AMD A8-9600

4

4

4 GB

True

Desktop

Intel G4400

2

2

4 GB

True

Desktop

Intel 6700K

4

8

16 GB

True

Note. Derived from AMD product resrouce center and Intel product specifications (Intel
Corporation, 2018; Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 2018). * Difference from published values
due to virtualization.

Appendix C contains every detail of the final configuration and remastering process for
the ArchISO. The process began with obtaining and mounting the Arch Linux ISO, which is
typically burned to a disc or written to USB as bootable media. Once mounted, the contents of
the ISO were copied and unpacked with unsquashfs so they were mutable for remastering. The
script was copied from the host to the ArchISO file system followed by entering that file system
as root using arch-chroot. The first task in the chroot environment was to change the script
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permissions to include executable. The next series of steps comprised the installation of the
dependencies for the script, most importantly dmidecode and hpl. The dmidecode utility is the
non-benchmark component of the script, which allows for the collection of system information.
After the completion of the other chroot steps, which are detailed in Appendix C, the
final tasks involved repackaging the file system and preparing it to be written to USB media.
First, the new squashfs file system was created using mksquashfs followed by calculating the
sha512sum of the file system, which is required for the generation of a bootable ISO. The
volume identifier must also be an exact match, so the isoinfo was used to extract it from the
original ArchISO file. With those preparatory steps complete, the xorriso tool was used to
generate the USB-ready, bootable ISO. The ISOs were first tested on the virtual environment in
Table 6, prior to being written to USB using dd. The order of development for the platform and
script were reverse, since moving the script to the platform was the first platform step.
The data collection script served as a wrapper for the benchmark collection instruments
high performance Linpack (HPL) and Cryptsetup. As both benchmarks run in memory, the
system component of storage had no impact on the performance results. HPL measures
performance in terms of floating-point operations per second (FLOPS). It is capable of running
on systems ranging from single core, single thread to the largest supercomputers. Its prevalence
in the performance literature made it an ideal choice. The benchmark results expectedly differed
from the Intel optimized Linpack, as HPL is both double precision and CPU manufacturer
agnostic. Cryptsetup is a standard Linux utility used for file system encryption. It included a
benchmark very similar to the TrueCrypt benchmarks which was more popular in the literature
until it was abruptly discontinued. The collection script also contained the system information
collection commands and a web connection component, which automatically submitted the
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results upon completion. As previously stated, the script gathered no personal data. Table 7
describes each field, including the system details and both benchmarks along with their terms or
units.
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Table 7
Data fields.
Field

Description

Units/Format

Date_time

The date and time of the collection

Y/m/d H:i:s

Uuid

Universally Unique ID

N/A

System_hash

PSK hashed with the Uuid

N/A

Device_ID

The serial number of the USB drive

N/A

CPU_model

The CPU model name given by lscpu

N/A

CPU_Sig

Stepping, model, family

N/A

CPU_arch

Architecture, sockets, cores per socket,

N/A

threads per core
Memory

Total, used, free

MB

AES_Instructions

AES NI present and enabled

Boolean; present/not

AES_Bench

The AES benchmark result

MB/s

FLOPS_Bench

The FLOPS benchmark result

Giga-FLOPS

Appendix D contains the code, with detailed comments for replication or improvements
upon this study. The script executes automatically upon boot and begins by messaging to the user
and the construction and assignment of a few variables. It continues to test the Internet
connection and connection to the collection server; wired DHCP connection is required and
mentioned in the limitations and in the instructions to potential facilitators. To reduce the chance
of incorrect results, the script conducted these tests without using ping, in case the network
connection does not allow ICMP packets. If connectivity fails, the script stops as an automated

76

collection, since is not possible without connectivity. In the case of failure, the facilitators would
be prompted to check the connection and try again.
Following the progression of the execution of the collection script, the collection of
system information occurs first. The USB device identification is collected first using lsblk and
the known volume identification from the remastering process. No other storage devices are
accessed or identified. The system’s universally unique identification (UUID) is gathered next.
The UUID is used to delineate between duplicate configurations and the exact same system. It
also serves as a key part for validation of the results, to ensure the results actually arrive from the
collection script and not from another source.
The collection of the CPU model name, signature components, and architecture
information follow the UUID. The CPU model name is the descriptive independent variable for
H2. The stepping, model, and family comprise the signature components; the architecture,
sockets, cores per socket, and threads per core comprise the architecture information. These
fields are used to confirm the results are conducted on physical, non-virtual systems. A virtual
platform would produce inconsistent results for the CPU model name. In the next fields, the
script collects memory and AES instructions, whichare the descriptive independent variables for
H3 and H1 respectively.
With the system information fields complete, the script continues to run the benchmarks
starting with AES. The CryptSetup AES benchmark is conducted 10 times to produce 10 sample
results, of which the average is reported. The repetition ensures systems produce similar results
when retested. Too low a number, such as one, can have inconsistent results since, even on the
very light weight distro, other system-level processes and events may affect the results.
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The FLOPS benchmark using HPL is not as straight forward. HPL has numerous possible
parameters and methods to optimize operation speed (Chen, 2011). For this study, the majority
of the parameters were static to keep results as consistent as possible within the sample
population. The problem size, however, varied from system to system as HPL documentation
provides an equation based on free memory for problem size. Since the script already determined
the free memory as part of the system information fields, it uses that value here. Additionally,
HPL requires grid information, which is most applicable to many CPU systems and
supercomputers; however, the script uses the CPU sockets, cores, and threads per core to form a
simple grid size. The script uses mpirun to thread and execute the HPL benchmark. Once
complete, the script parses the output file to obtain the results.
The last block of the script reports the results to the collection server. It concatenates each
of the results together into a single string and formats the string for curl. The script then uses curl
to submit the results to the collection server. As the script finalizes, it reports to the user the
success or failure of the submission and offers to shut down the system.
Server Configuration, Collection Script, and Data Organization
From the submission of the results to the preparation of the data, the collection server is
the center component of the research design. The detailed configuration is included in Appendix
A for replication purposes. The collection server is an Amazon web services (AWS) elastic
compute cloud (EC2) running Linux Amazon machine image (AMI). It is a “micro”-type
instance with one virtual CPU, one GB memory, and eight GB storage. Although these
specifications may seem limited, they are more than sufficient for the collection server; the free
space could fit close to one million results. The configuration of the collection server is straight
forward. It begins with installing and enabling the httpd and php services. The configuration
continues with adding a user and giving permissions to the user to allow the results to be written
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to a data folder. It concludes with the creating of the folder and the transfer of ownership to the
web service user.
The collection script on the web server presents a very simple web form, to which the last
section of the benchmark script uses curl to submit the results. The PHP script and associated
HTML are included in Appendix B. The HTML is a simple form with a post method on submit
that invokes the PHP portion. The PHP checks the system hash, which is the hash of the simple
pre-shared key and the system’s UUID. If the submitted system hash matches the server
calculated system hash, the contents of the form fields, which are the benchmark script results
and system specifications, are written to a text file in the data folder. Duplicate reports from the
same system are appended to the previous results file for that system. The PHP posts a success
message, which the benchmark script processes to make its announcement to the facilitator.
The data compilation script parses the files on the collection server and compiles the data
into a useable spreadsheet format. Appendix F contains the Python code used for this script. The
process begins by localizing a copy of the server data using secure copy (SCP). Once local, the
script compiles each result into a row on a spreadsheet.
Validity
The validity of the research had three components: the validity of the instruments, the
method used to validate the instruments, and validations to be applied to the data post collection.
This section includes the validity considerations for the instruments and a description of the
validations, which followed data collection. The instruments were both benchmark utilities, high
performance Linpack (HPL) FLOPS benchmark and the Cryptsetup AES benchmark. The rest of
the collection methodology, including the web survey, the collection script, and the collection
web server, did not constitute instruments; rather they were a cohesive means of distributing the
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instruments, running the benchmarks, and collecting the results. Although, they are not
instruments, their validity was also ensured.
The validity of the non-instrument components of the research design was straight
forward. During the development process, additional outputs from the collection script provided
a verbose step by step log of the process. The results obtained from the server were verified as
the same as those displayed by the collection script. Additionally, each of the commands were
manually tested and compared with the results from the collection server to ensure the entirety of
the benchmark script, collection server, and retrieval process was functioning as intended and
valid.
The nature of benchmark instruments, which by design measure system performance,
provides a foundation of validity. In contrast to research involving humans, system performance
is mechanical. As many other FLOPS benchmarks exist, with a wide range of results on a single
system, the external validity of HPL is largely limited to other HPL-based FLOPS results.
Although other FLOPS benchmark projects, including SETI@home, have very large sample
populations, approaching 150,000 in 2018 (University of California, 2018), the HPL-based
results from this research had little in common with those results. The project results included the
CPU makes, models, and FLOPS; however, the results were based on the Whetstone benchmark,
which differs significantly from HPL. Furthermore, manufacturers also use different, highlyoptimizes FLOPS benchmarks to measure their products performance in addition to publishing
theoretical maximum performance numbers. The choice of HPL related to the attack feasibility
component of this study. Although criticized as not being the most representative of modern
workloads, HPL is the most commonly used benchmark for high performance systems like large
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clusters and super computers, where the greatest capability to complete cryptographic attacks is
present (Heroux & Dongarra, 2013).
The post-collection validations sought to identify the cause of outlier results and
eliminate experimental errors. Although single-socket HPL results were not widely available, the
prevalence and availability of FLOPS as a measurement of performance provided some external
validity. If needed, external results could have been leveraged to help identify and eliminate
inconsistent or erroneous results. Expected causes included temperature throttling and collection
from within virtual environments; however, unexpected causes would also need to be
investigated during this process.
Causes, such as temperature throttling, were a limitation that is partially mitigated by
external validation. Temperature throttling was also partially mitigated by the instructions to
facilitators as an identified limitation, as noted in Chapter 1. While the external performance data
provided by the manufacturers might expectedly be best-case or over optimized, data from
sources like SETI@home may be considered in conjunction with manufacturer data. Variance
was expected between the results of the benchmark used by the collection instrument for this
research, the manufacturer data, and other external sources, but the variance across similar
systems in the sample was expected to be limited. All outliers were fully investigated, when
comparing the level of variance between those data points.
Reliability
The reliability of the collection instruments, HPL and CryptSetup AES benchmark, was
already largely determined through their prominence in research; however, the implementation
of the benchmark script further ensured that repeated results were the same. HPL is recognized
worldwide as a standard benchmark, which by definition produces repeatedly reliable results.
Arguments against the reliability of HPL are sometimes made based on the highly tunable nature
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of the parameters for the benchmark. To eliminate the variables of configuration overoptimization, standard, single-socket parameters were selected. The fields that do require
customization, problem size and grid, were gathered from each system as the HPL
documentation requires those parameters to be based on system memory and threads. The results
from CryptSetup vary more than HPL. To limit the variance, the benchmark script took 10
samples and reported the average. The instrumentation section contains the details of this
process.
The research design included the collection of extra system fields, which are not
descriptive variables, but instead were used to determine atypical configurations, which were
likely to produce invalid results. For example, a modern CPU with the AES instruction set
disabled, hyperthreading/hyper transport disabled, or running the script in a virtual environment
would expectedly produce results that differ from other CPUs of the same make and model.
Situations exist where these configurations might be warranted, but they are by no means
standard and would produce results outside of the norm and outside of the scope of this study.
Table 7 contains in the instrumentation sections each of the fields and their descriptions.
The results themselves may demonstrate reliability in two ways. The first is repeat
collection from the same system. During the testing and development of the benchmark and
collection scripts, many duplicate results were amassed. Results from the same iteration of the
design process were nearly identical. Duplicate results could also be present during the data
collection portion of this research. Additionally, systems with identical hardware configurations
could further the reliability or help to identify anomalous results. For example, if one of three
different systems with the same model CPU, amount of memory, and presence of AES
instructions has significantly different performance; the unexpected difference would prompt
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further investigation as a potential experimental error. Conversely, if all three of those systems
had similar results, albeit some degree of difference was expected, the similarities would
reinforce the results. Since many system configurations are commonplace, the latter, reinforcing
example was expected to occur.
Data Collection
Once approved to begin data collection, a few final preparatory steps were conducted
before beginning the instrumentation and collection process. The preparation involved the
facilitator site, collection server, and final verifications of the construct. Both the facilitator site
and collection server were brought online during development and testing phase; however, if
they were not, they would been brought online at this time. The collection server contained a
variety of test data results, artifacts of development process. Those testing and development
results were archived to ensure they remained separate from the results to be included in the
study. As a form of final verification, the entire data collection process was conducted following
the exact steps that the facilitators would use on locally available systems, including the testing
platforms from Table 6, but excluding the virtual machine.
The process depicted in Figure 5 began with the distribution of the interest email
containing the link to the facilitator site. The initial audience included professional colleagues
and personal acquaintances who expressed interest in the research; however, the design of the
study would have allowed for expansion as necessary during the data analysis. Once the interest
email was sent, the duplication and verification of USB drives with the modified ArchISO and
the collection script began to meet the anticipated facilitator audience. As the requests were
received for in person and by mail receipt of the USB drives, the requests were promptly
fulfilled. The download method was immediate and did not require any action or intervention for
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the distribution of the collection device. In all cases of USB drive receipt, assistance was made
available for facilitators to overcome any problems they encountered.
The facilitators received the USB drives with instructions describing booting to a Linux
USB device. As the benchmarks, system data collection, and upload to the collection server were
all automated in the instrumentation and collection design, the researcher remained in the support
role, being available to answer questions. The researcher addressed any issues with the
instrumentation and collection design but only modified the design if it precluded an entire
category of systems. At regular intervals, the researcher connected to the collection server to
check for results, retrieved the results using SCP, and organized the results into a spreadsheet
using the Python script prior to including those results in the data analysis.
Data Analysis
The data analysis process began with the data collection. As the collection server
received results, the results were periodically retrieved and validated followed by initial tests
aligned with H0, H2, and H3. As sample size was not set at a specific number of systems, the
results of the periodic tests helped to determine length of the data collection. H0 was tested using
linear regression with the HPL FLOPS result as the independent variable and the CryptSetup
AES benchmark result as the dependent variable. The study looked for significant two-tailed pvalues of less than 0.001 for the presence of a relationship and a correlation of determination
above 0.9 for that relationship to be considered strong. If a strong relationship was present,
further tests included a predicted correlation of determination test to determine the viability of
using FLOPS as a predictor of AES performance.
The initial tests for H1, H2, and H3 were conducted using multiple regression to
determine the developing effects of the AES instructions, CPU, and memory. The same
confidence levels were used as H0 with the aforementioned components as descriptive,
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independent variables. H1 was expected to be accepted since the 2010 introduction of AES
instructions greatly improved AES performance (Gueron, 2010). However, it was possible that
the null would not be rejected due to all CPUs in the sample having AES instructions present.
The initial tests ended with the collection and were repeated with the final set of results after the
validation process.
Ethical Considerations
The study and the associated data collection did not involve participants in the traditional
sense. The very limited human participation did not involve humans as the subjects of the
research. Rather, the human involvement in the study was in the role of facilitation. Although the
concerns addressed in the Belmont Report are primarily applicable for research with human
subjects, the components of informed consent still have application to this study. Participating
individuals and organizations received detailed information about every component of the
facilitation process. This information contained many of the same core components from the
Belmont Report, including information, comprehension, and voluntariness (U.S. Department of
Health & Human Services, 1979).
Additional considerations for privacy and security were made. No personal information
was gathered and local storage was never accessed by the benchmark collection script. The
participating individuals and organizations had access to the source code of the benchmark script
and configuration information of the Arch ISO Linux. The only means of tracking the number of
systems surveys completed by an individual or organization was through the automatic
submission of the USB drive serial number as part of the results submission.
The USB drive serial numbers were recorded with the associated individual or
organization as an additional means of verification but also to allow for recognition. If the
individual or organization desired recognition for their contribution to the study, they were able
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to receive recognition since their system surveys contained the serial number of the USB drive
that was sent to them. Individuals and organizations participating in the collection process also
received information pertaining to the USB boot process. The information included instructions
on how to boot to the USB media, a disclaimer about changing BIOS settings, and contact
information in case of emergency. While one-time boot menus and booting to USB media does
not pose a direct risk, user unfamiliarity with the BIOS or boot process could have introduced
risk which was reduced through clarity of the documentation and availability of assistance during
the data collection process, in addition to requesting that the test not be run on any operational or
critical systems.
Summary of Chapter Three
This chapter covered method and supporting information. It tied in the research traditions
found in the literature with the conceptual framework. It restated the research questions and
hypotheses to ensure stand-alone value. This chapter used the research design as a blueprint for
the sample selection criteria, process, and size. It selected the statistic test that was used to
answer the research questions. It also detailed the collection mechanism, covered data analysis,
and addressed the unique ethical considerations of the study. This chapter included enough
details throughout for the study to be replicated in its entirety.
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CHAPTER FOUR
This chapter covers the execution of the collection process from the receipt of
Institutional Review Board approval through the analysis of the resulting data. It begins with
discrete descriptive statistics pertaining to the facilitators. The limitations and validating controls
precede the descriptive statistics and observations on each of the data points detailed in Chapter
3. It continues with the presentation of the results and the details of the statistics aligned with
each of the research questions and hypotheses. This chapter concludes with a presentation of the
findings and a discussion of the implications for the field.
Descriptive Statistics
The facilitator solicitation process began as soon as the Institutional Review Board
approved the research. During the one-month collection period, 20 facilitators completed the
Google Form in Appendix E acknowledging their role as facilitators and agreeing to participate.
Of the 20, 6 had their collection devices shipped, 3 downloaded the ISO preparing their own
USB devices, and 11 picked up the package locally. Two facilitators encountered issues with
systems that had secure boot enabled or complicated BIOS menus and did not provide results. In
total, 14 of the facilitators provided at least one result.
The one-month collection period yielded 44 results. Two of the results appeared to fall
into the previously identified temperature limitation. The temperature limitation impacts the
results when throttling occurs due to overheating. Result number 28 and result number 38
appeared to have been affected by temperature throttling. The internal control for the limitation,
similar or identical systems, as computers, maintaining similar performance on identical tasks,
helped eliminate one of these results. Result number 28 had identical specifics as two other
samples. The similarity in the other results and lack of similarity with the overheating results
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lead to the discarding of result 28. Table 8 depicts these similarities and differences given
systems with the specifications: Intel Core i7-4940MX, 16GB RAM, and AES instructions.
Table 8
Temperature throttled result
Number

Status

AES

GFLOP

Ratio

24

Normal

2485.12

12.24

203.0327

28

Throttled

848.54

4.976

170.5265

29

Normal

2487.65

12.1

205.5909

Despite temperature throttling, the ratio was not as affected as it might have been. The
throttling appeared to have a similar effect on both the benchmarks. The second temperature
throttled result lead to the discovery of an unanticipated limitation, which was introduced by the
sequential nature of the benchmarks in the collection script. The script runs the AES benchmark
followed by the FLOP benchmark. Despite the very limited duration of the collection script,
requiring less than five minutes from power on to shut down on the test platforms, throttling
occurred during or more heavily during the second of the two benchmarks. The partial throttling
appears to have skewed result 38. Unfortunately, this result did not have identically configured
systems in the sample to compare it to. Since the results of AES appear normal for that
generation of processor, yet the FLOP benchmark is on par with the CPUs five years older, this
result was also not included. Both the throttled results were on mobile scale processors, which
are known to throttle more frequently and aggressively than desktops.
Several examples in the data helped to reinforce the nature of computer systems,
maintaining the same performance, as a valid assumption. One example was the identical
desktop configurations, which produced results 14 and 15. The configurations were identical –
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Intel i5-6500, 8GB RAM, and AES instructions – but the desktops were discrete, different
systems. The results in Table 9 demonstrate the minimal, 0.16% difference between these
identically configured systems.
Table 9
Identical system configuration results
Number

AES

GFLOP

Ratio

14

2720.82

11.63

233.9484

15

2722.88

11.62

234.327

The largest variations in identically configured systems were found on the Intel Core i76820HQ, 16GB RAM, and AES instructions: True. Table 10 depicts the differences.
Table 10
Identical system configuration largest variations
Number

AES

GFLOP

Ratio

5

2699.43

11.18

241.4517

42

2624

11.4

230.1754

43

2703.61

10.32

261.9777

The benchmarks were also run twice on single systems – results 9 and 30. The system
was tested by separate facilitators working on the same group of systems. The configuration was
Intel Core i7-6820HK, 32GB RAM, and AES instructions: True. Table 11 depicts the again
minimal 0.14% difference.
Table 11
Same system results
Number

AES

GFLOP
89

Ratio

9

2705.37

12.13

223.0313

30

2703.86

12.14

222.7232

The categories, which relate to R2, have rich descriptive statistics. The first category
aligns with H1, which considered the effects of AES instructions on the level of correlation.
Prior to collection, it was unknown whether any systems without AES instructions would be
present in the results. Since 2011, AES instructions have been included in most x86_64 CPUs
(Gueron, 2010). Despite the prevalence of AES instructions on CPUs, systems without AES
instructions were represented in the sample as depicted in Table 12. Interestingly, one of the
systems without AES instructions, result 6, had a CPU, the Intel Core i5-3210M, which per
specification had AES instructions available. This difference may have indicated that the
instructions were either turned off in the BIOS or was due to a variant of the CPU without
instructions.
Table 12
AES instructions
Systems without AES instructions

Systems with AES instructions

5

38

H2 related to the processor. Variations between manufacturer and scale, such as AMD
versus Intel and mobile versus desktop, were expected and present in the sample. Although
AMD was underrepresented, the results were not noticeably different than Intel, but this claim
was further investigated as part of the statistic test aligned with R2. Table 13 depicts the
distribution between CPU manufacturers in the sample.
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Table 13
CPU manufacturer
AMD

Intel

4

39

In terms of scale, both general populations, mobile and desktop, were represented in the
sample data as depicted in Table 14.
Table 14
CPU scale
Desktop

Mobile

19

24

H3 relateds to the amount of memory present in the system. A variety of amounts were
present. The 6 GB amount was underrepresented, but is also uncommon as memory is
manufactured in powers of two. Table 15 depicts the memory amounts.
Table 15
Memory amounts
4 GB

6 GB

8 GB

16 GB

32 GB

5

2

12

19

5

Presentation of the Data
As the results arrived, they were compiled using the data compilation script described in
Chapter 3 and found in Appendix G. Appendix H contains the resulting, raw data. The date time
field was only included to assist with validations and was not included after this step. Fields
including the system hash, UUID, device ID and CPU signature were used to validate the data,
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find results from the same systems, and confirm that no results originated from virtual machines.
The previous section covered the observations and validation related to those fields. Since none
of the results originated from virtual machines and all of the device IDs were valid, these fields
were not included in subsequent tables as they lack statistical relevance. Appendix I contains the
remaining data, including the numeric AES and GFLOP data, in addition to the data used to form
categories for R2. Figure 6 depicts the distribution of the numeric portion in the results.
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Figure 6. Results
The fields AES instructions, CPU, and memory are not included in the numeric portion
but are required to answer R2. Appendix J contains the encoded results, where the CPU make
and model are replaced with encoded values for manufacturer and scale. The AES instruction
encoding is 0 for false and 1 for true. CPU is encoded 0 for AMD and 1 for Intel. The scale is 0
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for mobile and 1 for desktop. Finally, memory is in order of the amount of memory present
where 0 represents 4 GB, 1: 6GB, 2: 8GB, 3: 16 GB, and 4: 32 GB.
Presentation and Discussion of Findings
The first test, linear regression, examined the relationship between the traditional
floating-point benchmarks and the AES benchmarks for the entire sample. Figure 7 depicts the
results with a fit line. The data forms a recognizable pattern. The two-tailed p-value of
significantly less than 0.001 (1.194e-8) indicates a statistically significant relationship between
the AES and FLOP benchmarks. However, the correlation coefficient of 0.7486 and the resulting
coefficient of determination of 0.5604 indicate that the relationship is weak. Given the inclusion
of all categories of systems, especially those with and without AES instructions, the relationship
is expectedly weak. The resulting equation in Figure 7 is valid for the sample but lacks precision.
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Figure 7. Results with fit line
Notably, five of the six lowest outliers, those less than 500 MB/s AES, did not have AES
instructions.
The strong p-value leads to the rejection of the null hypothesis for H00, where no
statistically significant relationship is present, and the acceptance of the alternate H0A, where a
statistically significant relationship is present. The first research question, how correlated are the
results is answered in the relationship and coefficient of determination depicted in following
equation.
𝑦 = 151.3𝑥 + 720.35
𝑟 2 = 0.5604
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The statistic tests for the second research question, how the hardware configurations
effect the correlation between the benchmarks, were more involved. The multiple regression
included the presence or absence of AES instructions, the CPU scale of mobile versus desktop,
the CPU manufacturer, and amount of memory. The significance-F for the multiple regression is
much stronger than that of the linear regression at 1.38E-15. Furthermore, the correlation
coefficient of 0.9382 and resulting coefficient of determination of 0.8801 are much stronger than
the results of the linear regression test used for R1. The effect of AES instructions is the
strongest with a P-value of 7.46E-09. This impact was already observed in the Figure 7, as five
of the six lowest points lacked AES instructions, but now confirmed by the multiple regression.
CPU manufacturer is next with a P-value of 0.006924. Memory and scale are insignificant with
0.056246 and 0.643819 for P-values respectively.
These results led to conclusions for the hypotheses for research question two. For
hypothesis one, the effect of AES instructions on the correlations was the strongest, which led to
the rejection of the null hypothesis H10 and the acceptance of the alternate H1A. Neither
component of CPU, type nor scale, had significant effect on the relationship so the null
hypothesis H20 could not be rejected. Similarly, the amount of memory did not have a significant
impact so H30 could not be rejected either.
Summary of Chapter
This chapter presented the results from the collection process and the analysis of those
results in the context of the research questions and hypotheses. The chapter began with a review
of the collection process, which was followed by an outline of the facilitators and detailed
descriptive statistics for the sample population. The descriptive statistics encompassed controls
for validity. CPUs without AES instruction sets were expectedly limited and CPUs manufactured
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by AMD were underrepresented, but the results data set was varied and proved useful otherwise.
The chapter continued with the presentation of the results from the complete sample population,
which formed a recognizable pattern, and was followed by the results as they pertained to each
research question. The first research question utilized linear regression and found a weak
relationship between AES and floating-point performance. The second research question utilized
multiple regression and found a much stronger relationship where the presence or absence of
AES instructions had the greatest impact. This chapter concluded with a presentation of the
subset of the results with the greatest application as a predictive model.
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CHAPTER FIVE
This dissertation examined cryptographic attack feasibility against the advanced
encryption standard (AES) using a performance-based approach. The study was quantitative in
nature utilizing both linear and multiple regression. The design involved the facilitated execution
of benchmark pairs consisting of floating-point operations per second (FLOPS) and AES
throughput. The results showed statistically significant correlations between floating point and
AES performance. The correlations found through linear regression were significant but
expectedly weak for the entire sample population given the inclusion of central processing units
(CPUs) both with and without AES instructions.
The multiple regression showed that the presence or absence of AES instructions had the
greatest impact on the strength of the relationship. The rest of the components tested by multiple
regression had impacts, but none of them qualified as significant. The manufacturer of the CPU
had the largest of these impacts. Since the tests ran in memory, the amount of memory was
considered, but did not have a significant impact. Scale, mobile versus desktop, had a
surprisingly small impact as well. The impact of AES instructions was expected and, since most
modern CPUs have these hardware instructions, the subset of the results that excluded the older
CPUs without AES instructions were the most applicable for projecting the capability of future
systems.
Findings and Conclusions
The experiment involved the facilitated collection of system specifications and
benchmark pairs. It took place over the span of a month where 14 facilitators provided
benchmark pairs and system specifications from 44 systems. The process involved booting their
systems to provided USB drives, containing the collection script, which collected system
specifications and ran both AES and FLOPS benchmarks. The specifications involved the details
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of the CPU, including AES instructions, amount of memory, and a unique identifier for each
system in the sample. Before completion, the collection script reported the results to the web
server used for this research.
Upon completion of the collection period, compilation and validation were followed by
statistical analysis. Linear regression indicated a present albeit weak relationship for the entire
sample population. As the Intel white paper on AES new instructions indicated, it was
immediately evident in the results that the presence of AES instructions greatly influenced the
ratio between FLOPS and AES performance (Gueron, 2010). Multiple regression confirmed that
the largest factor in FLOPS as a predictor for AES performance is the presence or absence of
AES instructions. The CPU manufacturer, CPU scale, and amount of memory did not have
statistically significant impact on the results.
The relationships present in the results indicate a range of expected performance ratios on
other platforms and including near future systems. Since the design of the AES brute force is
mode agnostic and incredibly parallelizable, predicting AES performance at scale has universal
implications for attack feasibility. Despite the results being a moderate range, they are applicable
to form a lower and upper bound as a starting point for such approximations.
Limitations of the Study
The expected limitations were present in the study. Additionally, a few limitations were
discovered in the process. The anticipated limitations relating to the element human of the
facilitation process and temperature throttling were observed during the collection process. The
mitigation technique eliminated two of the results that were erroneous from throttling due to
overheating. Difficulty with the BIOS settings component of the facilitation process also caused
several of the facilitators to be unable to provide system benchmark results. The mitigation for
this limitation was availability for assistance, however, the mitigation was only partly successful;
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a few facilitators were still unable to boot to the USB device. A related but unforeseen limitation
was present in the collection mechanism; the sequential order of the benchmarks appeared to
impact at least one result and should be further mitigated in follow-on research.
The delimitations, which constrained the scope of the study to a manageable level, also
limited the external validity of the results. Only x86_64 CPUs were included, leaving the
potential of ARM and GPU compute unassessed by this study. Unlike manufacturer optimized
variants of Linpack, which expectedly have significant performance benefits for their respective
CPUs, the use of high-performance Linpack (HPL) on single systems provides a stable
benchmark across CPU manufacturers. HPL is not as common on individual systems, so relating
the results to those already readily available for individual CPUs is not possible. HPL is the
standard for the high-performance computing field and supercomputers where the concentrated
performance potential will allow attacks to approach the feasible point first.
Implications for Practice
Since the presence of AES instructions had significant effect on the relationship between
FLOPS and AES performance in addition to AES instructions being present in most modern
CPUs, the subset of the results with AES instructions are most useful for projecting attack
performance potential. The following equation depicts the results of the linear regression fit line.
𝑦 = 90.425𝑥 + 1543.9
𝑟 2 = 0.5643
The analysis of the average ratio of AES throughput in MB/s to Giga-FLOPS of
268.6048 for systems with AES instructions is another useful result for the study. The above
equation or average could be quickly applied to published performance measurements of the top
supercomputers to provide rough estimates of their attack potential. Similarly, they could be
applied to a botnet of known size or computational capability in addition to a variety of
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theoretical systems or configurations. Lastly as a predictive measure, this study or the results of
other follow-on studies might allow for projection of intersection power between increasing
global compute availability and AES attack requirements.
Recommendations for Future Research
This dissertation may serve as a foundation for future research on performance-based
attack feasibility. The lessons learned and limitations encountered in the process of planning and
conducting this study may allow a future study with a revised collection construct to improve
upon the accuracy of the results. Additional computational platforms such as graphics processing
units (GPU) and ARM may also be the most fitting future topics, but the potential of application
specific integrated circuits (ASICs) may warrant additional research as well. Future research may
also benefit from employing custom AES benchmarks to emulate the different components of a
brute force attack rather than the single component emulated in this study. In the predictive
sense, the results of this study may serve as a starting point for estimating the attack potential of
high-performance systems, including supercomputers and distributed systems.
GPUs lack AES hardware instructions. However, GPUs excel at highly parallel tasks and
the designs of many AES attacks align well with this pattern. Furthermore, GPUs make up a
significant portion of global compute. These platform advantages of GPUs may warrant followon research to assess their attack potential. Research on the attack capability of GPUs may also
align with the work done by Biryukov and Großschädl (2012) on application-specific, GPU-like
hardware. Although their work is an excellent addition to the field, the changes in computing
performance since 2012 may warrant an updated assessment of the attack potential of an
updated, theoretical AES supercomputer. Methods in the literature on performance measurement
and prediction would support a similar study for projecting the expected capability of GPUs
(Madougou, Varbanescu, Laat, & Nieuwpoort, 2016; Phillips & Fatica, 2014). In addition to
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GPUs, the ARM architecture may deserve a separate but similar study. ARM is continuing to
gain popularity and now includes AES instructions on many models. Unlike GPUs, the
prevalence of ARM is in the sheer number of devices rather than the greater potential for each
device.
The attack feasibility element of this research may augment current methods or serve as
another technique for key length recommendations. As the computing environment continues to
evolve, the scaling of this research and use of the results as a predictive mechanism when
combined with the rate of change of available compute may be significant. This potential
application and future study align with the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) recommendations for key lengths and transitions (Barker & Dang, 2015; Barker &
Roginsky, 2011; Barker & Roginsky, 2015).
Conclusion
This dissertation focused on AES performance, its relationship to general purpose
performance, and what that relationship could mean in terms of attack feasibility. The topic was
chosen to augment the field of cryptographic attack feasibility by providing an additional method
and results. The results demonstrated a significant relationship between general performance and
AES performance. Although the relationship was not overly strong, the results do provide a
range of expected performance, which may help improve upon the community’s capability to
predict attack feasibility for AES key lengths. Finally, the study may serve as a foundation for
future attack feasibility research and additional methods.
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APPENDIX A
Web Server Configuration
The configuration is in bash script format to enhance its clarity, but the it is not intended
to be executed script as it lacks error checking. Instead, the commands should be entered
individually to confirm the success of each command.
#Distro: Amazon Linux AMI 2016.09.0 (HVM), SSD Volume, 64-bit
#Type: t2.micro variable ECUs, 1 vCPUs, 2.5 GHz, Intel Xeon, 1 GiB RAM
#Setup Commands:
#install apache and php, run apache with system start, confirm config
sudo yum update -y # -y to skip additional prompts
sudo yum install -y httpd24 php56
sudo service httpd start
sudo chkconfig httpd on
chkconfig --list httpd # should show 2, 3, 4, 5
#make group, add user, confirm config
sudo groupadd www
sudo usermod -a -G www ec2-user
logout
groups
#set owner, set permissions, recurse permissions, confirm config
sudo chown -R root:www /var/www
sudo chmod 2775 /var/www
find /var/www -type d -exec sudo chmod 2775 {} \;
find /var/www -type f -exec sudo chmod 0664 {} \;
ls -al /var/www
#make the data directory, set permissions, confirm config
sudo mkdir /srv/data
sudo chown apache:apache /srv/data
sudo chmod 777 /srv/data
ls -al /srv/data
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APPENDIX B
Web Server Data Collection Script
<?php
//simple pre-shared key, used for validity check
$psk = md5('What a journey');
//date time for timestamps
date_default_timezone_set("America/New_York");
//if sumbit is posted
if ($_SERVER["REQUEST_METHOD"] == "POST") {
//check if the system_hash is valid
if (md5($psk.$_POST["uuid"]) == $_POST["system_hash"]) {
//open the file for the system_hash, create if not found
$results = fopen("/srv/data/".$_POST["system_hash"].".txt", "a");
//write the results
fwrite($results, "date_time ".date("Y/m/d H:i:s")."\n");
fwrite($results, "system_hash ".$_POST["system_hash"]."\n");
fwrite($results, "uuid ".$_POST["uuid"]."\n");
fwrite($results, "device_id ".$_POST["device_id"]."\n");
fwrite($results, "cpu_model ".$_POST["cpu_model"]."\n");
fwrite($results, "cpu_sig ".$_POST["cpu_sig"]."\n");
fwrite($results, "cpu_arch ".$_POST["cpu_arch"]."\n");
fwrite($results, "memory ".$_POST["memory"]."\n");
fwrite($results, "aes_inst ".$_POST["aes_inst"]."\n");
fwrite($results, "aes_bench ".$_POST["aes_bench"]."\n");
fwrite($results, "flops_bench ".$_POST["flops_bench"]."\n");
//separate successive results from the same system
fwrite($results, $result . "\n\n");
//close the file, announce success
fclose($results);
echo "Submit successful!";
} else {
echo "Submit failed, invalid system_hash.";
}
}
?>
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<body>
<form method="post" action="<?php echo $_SERVER['PHP_SELF'];?>">
system_hash <input type="text" name="system_hash"><br>
uuid <input type="text" name="uuid"><br>
device_id <input type="text" name="device_id"><br>
cpu_model <input type="text" name="cpu_model"><br>
cpu_sig <input type="text" name="cpu_sig"><br>
cpu_arch <input type="text" name="cpu_arch"><br>
memory <input type="text" name="memory"><br>
aes_inst <input type="text" name="aes_inst"><br>
aes_bench <input type="text" name="aes_bench"><br>
flops_bench <input type="text" name="flops_bench"><br>
<input type="submit">
</form>
</body>
</html>
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APPENDIX C
USB Linux Configuration
#Author: Daniel Hawthorne
#Distro: Arch Linux | Release: 2018.05.01 | Kernel: 4.16.5
#Media: SanDisk Cruzer Blade CZ50 8 GB USB 2.0
#Config: ArchISO x86_64
#Description: This document contains the steps used to modify the live
#ArchISO to include the packages and scripts necessary for use in this
#research.
#References:
#https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/Archiso
#https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/Remastering_the_Install_ISO
#Note: These instructions are from an Arch Linux-based Distro. They are
#written as a bash script, but are not tested in that form. Rather they
#are designed to be executed sequentially.
#Step 1: Confirm required packages synced
sudo pacman -S --needed cdrtools squashfs-tools arch-install-scripts \
libisoburn syslinux
#Step 2: Get the ISO
#Download and verify the ISO from you choice of mirrors at:
#https://archlinux.org/download/
#will move to below when a new version is released:
#https://archive.archlinux.org/iso/
#Step 3: Mount the ISO, copy ISO contents, unmount the ISO, clean up mnt
sudo mkdir /mnt/archiso
sudo mount -t iso9660 -o loop \
~/Downloads/archlinux-2018.05.01-x86_64.iso /mnt/archiso
#make sure ~/customiso does not already exist:
sudo rm -r ~/customiso
sudo cp -a /mnt/archiso ~/customiso
sudo umount /mnt/archiso
sudo rm -r /mnt/archiso
#Step 4: Unpack the file system
cd ~/customiso/arch/x86_64
sudo unsquashfs airootfs.sfs
#Step 5: Move the benchmark script to the target filesystem
sudo cp ~/Downloads/bench.sh \
~/customiso/arch/x86_64/squashfs-root/etc/profile.d
#Step 6: Modify the custom ISO as root
#enter ISO filesystem as root
sudo arch-chroot squashfs-root /bin/bash
#update the permissions of the benchmark script
chmod +x /etc/profile.d/bench.sh
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#add a root password so pkgbuild will work
passwd root #root
#prepare the package manager
pacman-key --init
pacman-key --populate archlinux
#add repo for yaourt
echo -e "\n[archlinuxfr]\nSigLevel = Never\n" >> /etc/pacman.conf
echo -e "Server = http://repo.archlinux.fr/\$arch" >> /etc/pacman.conf
#sync package database
pacman -Sy
#may need to remove checkspace if error when getting packages
nano /etc/pacman.conf
#comment out CheckSpace
#get packages
pacman -S dmidecode binutils yaourt fakeroot make patch
sudo -u nobody yaourt -S hpl #follow prompts to build/install
#update the package list
LANG=C pacman -Sl | \
awk '/\[installed\]$/ {print $1 "/" $2 "-" $3}' > /pkglist.txt
#clean package database
pacman -Scc
#clean bash history and exit chroot
cat /dev/null > ~/.bash_history && history -c && exit
#Step 7: Create New filesystem
#move package list
sudo mv squashfs-root/pkglist.txt ~/customiso/arch/pkglist.x86_64.txt
#remove old, make new, clean up
sudo rm airootfs.sfs
sudo mksquashfs squashfs-root/ airootfs.sfs
sudo rm -r squashfs-root/
sudo sha512sum airootfs.sfs | sudo tee airootfs.sha512
#Step 8: Make the new ISO
cd ~
#get iso label
iso_label=$(isoinfo -i ~/Downloads/archlinux-2018.05.01-x86_64.iso -d \
| grep 'Volume id:' | cut -d' ' -f3)
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#make the image (USB ready)
sudo xorriso -as mkisofs \
-iso-level 3 \
-full-iso9660-filenames \
-volid "${iso_label}" \
-eltorito-boot /isolinux/isolinux.bin \
-eltorito-catalog /isolinux/boot.cat \
-no-emul-boot -boot-load-size 4 -boot-info-table \
-isohybrid-mbr ~/customiso/isolinux/isohdpfx.bin \
-output ~/arch-custom.iso \
~/customiso
#test with virtual machine, if desired
#Step 9: Write the custom ISO (repeat as necessary):
sudo fdisk -l #determine usb disk label
sudo dd bs=4M if=~/arch-custom.iso of=/dev/sdb status=progress
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APPENDIX D
Benchmark Script
#!/bin/bash
#Author: Daniel Hawthorne
echo -e "\nBenchmark script starting in 10 seconds."
echo -e "Press Ctrl+C to exit to Terminal.\n"
sleep 10
echo "Script started!"
echo -n "Setting up environment. "; sleep 1
test_url="http://www.google.com"
#collection server url, may change if taken offline
collection_server="http://ec2-107-21-89-87.compute-1.amazonaws.com"
#psk for validity check
psk=$(echo -n 'What a journey' | md5sum | awk '{print $1}')
#usb device_id
device_id=$(lsblk -d -o name,label,serial | \
grep ARCH_201805 -m 1 | awk '{print $3}')
#check the connection
echo -ne "Done!\nChecking connection. "; sleep 1
conn=$(curl -s -I --retry 5 --retry-connrefused --url $test_url)
if [[ $conn = *"OK"* ]]; then
echo -ne "Success!\nChecking results server. "; sleep 1
rsc=$(curl -s -I --retry 5 --retry-connrefused --url $collection_server)
if [[ $rsc = *"OK"* ]]; then
echo -ne "Success!\nGathering system info. "; sleep 1
#uuid
uuid=$(sudo dmidecode | grep -i 'uuid' | awk '{print $2}' |\
tr '[:upper:]' '[:lower:]')
#system_hash
system_hash=$(echo -n $psk$uuid | md5sum | awk '{print $1}')
#cpu_model (model name)
cpu_model=$(lscpu | grep -i 'model name' |\
awk '{print substr($0, index($0,$3))}' | sed -e 's/ /_/g')
#cpu_sig (stepping, model, family)
cpu_sig=$(echo -n $(lscpu | grep -i 'stepping' | awk '{print $2}')"_"\
$(lscpu | grep -i 'model' | grep -v 'name' | awk '{print $2}')"_"\
$(lscpu | grep -i 'family' | awk '{print $3}'))
#cpu_arch (architecture, sockets, cores per socket, threads per core)
arch=$(lscpu | grep -i 'architecture' | awk '{print $2}')
sockets=$(lscpu | grep -i 'socket(s)' | awk '{print $2}')
cores=$(lscpu | grep -i 'core(s) per socket' | awk '{print $4}')
threads=$(lscpu | grep -i 'thread(s) per core' | awk '{print $4}')
cpu_arch=$(echo $arch"_"$sockets"_"$cores"_"$threads)
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#memory (used, free, total in megabytes)
unalias free 2> /dev/null
memory=$(free -m | grep -i 'mem' | awk '{print $3 "_" $4 "_" $2}')
#aes_inst
if [ $(lscpu | grep -ci aes) -ge 1 ];\
then aes_inst=true; else aes_inst=false; fi
#aes_bench (in MiB/s [source review confirmed])
aes_bench=0
aes_bench_count=10
echo -ne "Done!\nRunning AES benchmarks. "
for ((loop=1;loop<=$aes_bench_count;loop++)); do
aes_bench_next=$(cryptsetup benchmark --cipher aes |\
grep aes | awk -F' ' '{print $5}')
aes_bench=$(bc <<< "scale=2; $aes_bench+$aes_bench_next")
done; sleep 2
#divide by number of tests
aes_bench=$(bc <<< "scale=2; $aes_bench/$aes_bench_count")
#flops_bench setup
echo -ne "Done!\nRunning FLOPS benchmark. "
#size_dimensions=sqrt((free memory in bytes * 0.05) / 8)
free_mem=$(free -b | grep -i 'mem' | awk '{print $4}')
use_mem=$(bc <<< "scale=2; $free_mem*0.05")
prob_size=$(bc <<< "scale=0; sqrt($use_mem/8)")
#prepare the config file
#reference: www.netlib.org/benchmark/hpl/tuning.html
#
www.netlib.org/benchmark/hpl/faqs.html
line1_2="config\nfile\n" #unused
line3_4="HPL.out\n6\n" #output file, type
line5_6="1\n$prob_size\n" #num prob sizes, prob size(s)
line7_8="1\n16\n" #num block sizes, block size(s)
line9="0\n" #process mapping (0 row-major, 1 column-major)
line10_12="1\n$(($sockets*$threads))\n$cores\n" #num grids, P, Q
line13="16.0\n" #residual threshold
line14_21="1\n2\n1\n4\n1\n2\n1\n1\n"
line22_23="1\n1\n" #num broadcast, broadcast type [0..5]
line24_25="1\n0\n" #num look ahead, look ahead depth [0..2]
line26_27="2\n64\n" #swap type [0..2], swap threshold
line28_31="0\n0\n1\n8\n"
#combine the config lines
config="$line1_2$line3_4$line5_6$line7_8$line9$line10_12$line13"
config="$config$line14_21$line22_23$line24_25$line26_27$line28_31"
#write the config file
echo -e $config | sudo tee /etc/hpl/HPL.dat >/dev/null
#run the benchmark
sudo -u nobody mpirun --oversubscribe \
-n $(($sockets*$cores*$threads)) \
/usr/bin/xhpl-ompi > ~/HPL.out
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#get the flops value
flops_bench=$(cat ~/HPL.out | grep -m 2
awk END{print} | awk '{print $7}')

Gflops -A2 | \

#results_string
echo -ne "Done!\nSubmitting results. "
results_string=$(echo -n "system_hash="$system_hash"&"\
"uuid="$uuid"&device_id="$device_id"&cpu_model="$cpu_model"&"\
"cpu_sig="$cpu_sig"&cpu_arch="$cpu_arch"&memory="$memory"&"\
"aes_inst="$aes_inst"&aes_bench="$aes_bench"&"\
"flops_bench="$flops_bench"&submit=Submit" | tr -d '[:space:]')
#submit results
if [ $(curl -s -d $results_string \
$collection_server"/index.php" |\
head -n1 | grep -ci 'success') -ge 1 ];\
then echo "Success!"; else echo "Failed."
fi
else
echo "Failed. Proxy or filter blocking *.amazonaws.com? Server down?"
fi
else
echo "Failed. Wired connection? DHCP available? Cable attached?"
fi
#goodbye
echo "Script complete!"
echo "Press Enter to Shutdown or Ctrl+C to exit to terminal."
read -s
sudo shutdown now
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APPENDIX E
Facilitator Google Form
Link to the facilitator Google Form:
https://www.tinyurl.com/dshawth-dcs

Dissertation Research Facilitation
Thank you for your interest in assisting with the facilitation of my dissertation research!
The goal of the research is to better understand, and possibly project, the cryptographic attack
potential of general purpose hardware against the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). The results
of this research will be published in my dissertation and hopefully help the security community to
better project key length vulnerabilities.
Please review the research design, requirements, and disclaimer below before checking the
acknowledgement and continuing to the sign-up page. Thank you in advance for considering the study
or assisting with its facilitation!
Respectfully,
Daniel Hawthorne

Research Design
The research involves the collection of performance pairs from a variety of computer hardware
configurations. The pairs consist of a general purpose benchmark in terms of floating point
operations per second (FLOPS) and an AES benchmark.
The benchmarks are conducted by booting computers to an Arch Linux based USB flash drive.
The collection script automatically runs on boot, conducts the benchmarks, and submits the
results to an EC2 instance.
The collection is limited to hardware and performance information. The collection script does not
access any other storage devices or collect any personal information.
The source code is available for review at the link below:
https://github.com/dshawth/DCS
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Requirements
A computer or computers (the more samples, the better) with the following:
1) An x86_64 processor (AMD and Intel, desktop and laptop processors since 2004)
2) The ability to boot to Linux on a USB device (May require enabling Legacy Boot Option ROM)
3) A wired internet connection
You will receive a USB drive that is ready to go or you can choose to download the binary and
create one on your own. Power down, plug in, and boot to the drive. The script takes about 5
minutes to run and shuts down when complete. Detailed instructions will be provided with the
USB drive.

Data Fields Collected
The collection script gathers the follow system information fields:
1) Universally Unique Identification (UUID)
2) Device ID (of the USB drive)
3) CPU: model name, signature (stepping, model, family), and architecture (sockets, cores per
socket, threads per core)
4) Memory: Total, free, used
5) AES Instructions: Present/Not
The benchmark fields are:
1) Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Benchmark
2) Floating point operations per second (FLOPS) Benchmark

Disclaimer
Booting to a live USB can be challenging. It may require you to make changes in your BIOS to
change your boot order.
Changes in your BIOS should be done with caution, as the researcher cannot be held
responsible for damages due to BIOS configuration mistakes.
If you have any questions or need help with the process, please reach me at
daniel.s.hawthorne@gmail.com.
If you meet the requirements and agree to these terms, please continue and thank you in
advance for your support!

Acknowledgement
I meet the requirements, understand fields to be collected, acknowledge
the risks of booting to USB, and consent to assist with the facilitation of this
research.
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Dissertation Research Facilitation
* Required

Facilitation Sign Up
Name (as you want it to appear in the publication where applicable) *

Include name and number of result(s) in the final publication *

Email *

Phone number

Comments

How do you want to receive the USB drive? *

Complete Mailing Address (For mail option only)
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Download Instructions (For download option only)
Follow the link below to get the ISO:
https://github.com/dshawth/DCS/releases
LINUX:
Get the serial number of your USB drive for the device ID field below using terminal:
fdisk -l #to determine the sdX of your target device
lsblk -d -o name,label,serial #to get the serial
Write the USB using:
dd bs=4M if=~/Downloads/arch-custom.iso of=/dev/sdX status=progress
WINDOWS:
Get the serial number of your USB drive for the device ID field below using PowerShell:
gwmi Win32_USBControllerDevice |%{[wmi]($_.Dependent)} | Where-Object {($_.Description like '*mass*')} | Sort Description,DeviceID | ft Description,DeviceID –auto
The serial number is right of the last \ in DeviceID.
Write the USB using Rufus with default options; when prompted choose the DD method.

Device ID (For download option only)
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APPENDIX F
USB Instructions
Dear Facilitator,
Thank you again for your willingness to help with my research pertaining to the feasibility of
cryptographic attacks against the advanced encryption standard (AES)! The included USB drive
is already imaged and ready for use. Please help me keep this research on a manageable
timeframe by conducting the tests at your earliest convenience.
Shutdown each computer and attach the USB drive. Power on the system and enter the boot
menu by tapping the key designated by the manufacturer (commonly F12) as soon as the
computer begins to power on.
If you miss the boot menu, you may have to shut down and try again. If the USB drive does not
appear on the list of bootable devices, you may have to enable legacy option ROMs in your
BIOS. To enter the BIOS, tap the key designated by the manufacturer (commonly DEL or F2) as
soon as the computer begins to power on.
Once you have successfully selected the USB drive, an Arch Linux boot menu will display;
choose the first option and the boot process will continue. Once started, the script will collect
the specs from your system, conduct the benchmarks, submit the results, and wait for you to
confirm shutdown. Once powered off, remove the USB drive and repeat the process on other
systems where possible.
The data fields and source are available on the survey form at https://tinyurl.com/dshawth-dcs.
Feel free to reach me with any questions at daniel.s.hawthorne@gmail.com.
Once complete with your system(s), the more the better, the USB drive is yours to keep!
Respectfully,
Daniel Hawthorne
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APPENDIX G
Data Compilation Script
#Program: compile-data.py
#Author: Daniel Hawthorne
#Python: 3.6.2
import os #for files in folder
rawFolder = r"X:\Google Drive\School\Dissertation\Results\Raw"
fields = ["date_time", "system_hash", "uuid", "device_id", "cpu_model", \
"cpu_sig", "cpu_arch", "memory", "aes_inst", "aes_bench", "flops_bench"]
outFile = open("results.csv", 'w')
#write fields as headers
outFile.write(','.join(fields) + '\n')
for fileName in os.listdir(rawFolder):
if fileName.endswith('.txt'):
print(fileName)
#open, read, close the file
recordFile = open(os.path.join(rawFolder,fileName), 'r')
fileLines = list(filter(None, recordFile.read().splitlines()))
recordFile.close()
lines = []
for line in fileLines:
#remove any commas from cpu strings
line = line.replace(',', '_')
#fields
if len(line.split()) > 1:
lines.append('_'.join(line.split()[1:]))
else:
lines.append('')
#last line
if line.startswith('flops_bench'):
lines.append('\n')
outFile.write(','.join(lines))
lines = []
outFile.close()
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APPENDIX H
Raw Results
date_time
2018/05/17_10:35:36
2018/05/17_10:53:48
2018/05/17_11:12:04
2018/05/17_11:26:48
2018/05/17_20:09:26
2018/05/24_10:14:31
2018/05/24_14:06:04
2018/05/24_14:25:09
2018/05/28_21:18:00
2018/05/28_21:34:44
2018/05/29_22:05:35
2018/05/29_22:22:45
2018/05/29_23:23:08
2018/05/30_19:39:26
2018/05/30_19:57:03
2018/06/01_18:16:09
2018/06/02_17:07:36
2018/06/02_17:42:52
2018/06/02_17:48:08
2018/06/02_19:00:04
2018/06/05_23:13:22
2018/06/06_15:16:22
2018/06/07_06:30:36
2018/06/07_14:55:30
2018/06/07_15:05:32
2018/06/07_21:08:59
2018/06/07_22:01:00
2018/06/08_10:33:57
2018/06/08_10:53:47
2018/06/08_11:28:30
2018/06/08_11:38:30
2018/06/08_12:00:40
2018/06/08_16:23:22
2018/06/09_19:16:13
2018/06/13_18:07:23
2018/06/14_16:08:04
2018/06/15_17:06:15
2018/06/15_17:35:12
2018/06/21_12:23:16
2018/06/28_09:50:37
2018/06/28_11:27:28
2018/07/12_11:37:48
2018/07/13_15:48:50
2018/07/16_20:17:34

system_hash
4dfbd6a7b7e30c20c243d17c3dafa5cb
d7f3ea5d9770ce0b826a1c5312b37b09
5bcc9a1780b3cd4b98bba1ea07972ad6
45b0f1d91d17f9b18d89a92e9bb061ee
de20148de31143079a7eb0782a93e0b8
f8c9542df4177659b8fcb0bf9b46bc65
c5f1f2c3746e88e6684d1c3e9d4e7db9
5631c6a162718e2cd28e71e340042b8c
9e5e5c36904f1fd245dc331a4e9ed078
978ad4f56200102e09d184313dc483bf
173af41a127bd505e429e27932d3e598
d275336c15f3fc5153d44a7b1a1b577e
c1d6d95fedb8ffd62949427565381b79
5da0933b47218205fa61c81086fdcc0a
c418fe3fd031f3ebf142ebcba35c1d1b
03363a2ac12693b214182a411d1c1a89
ddfe6bf874d72ed2ba92bd207aceab5a
0ea8fd37c987e0a84c9e45247bc59cab
73d2c70811efeb397b6aa4719407c570
b3e5393a4c152b24e274967b4681daf0
4ba558288eb42c39107dc0dda426070e
beb8e8373ac6f858bd9d0bdd6e1cc67c
355904f000fd84d5884d1af3365f55dd
a02fd28b03a1c3c5ead1d0cbc140afe1
66db2b7ef947acd4e481c10210efb619
07f741d29304d8d1f22afbd0bd6a337a
ae37c2ee0d328312d11c7d81fb83db78
9712eecf5b6e68e0e3a7fe8b19238271
af55e9e5f6bae00d243082d724ad05a5
9e5e5c36904f1fd245dc331a4e9ed078
d03f87ce7c9567e5194a16bbbf7c8fa3
b6ecc3b44f352783e57c0ecf6af48038
159fb278dcb9c616fb693ab155afc30a
ed7422ef35fbdcb6a72bc9b918cd1518
7a39abda3e04d9a4276f73e33254ba80
68cb09e52bfa08e63b16d844279a9355
f8f0cf9fd0a9909539b298ae85ab9917
f50734cd14ba669b7979390cda8ab3e0
4ad2a47ac5250017884014ab561f01e7
def6e03aa246cd9837ac29066c966e5c
39f653d247031aa1de8c1207c07aaa55
0682cbbe5e36773756166ba6138d33cf
720dba50bf57ccd413158cd281e8f248
355455e3a77d07680d86e5ced0b34e89

uuid
4c4c4544-0053-4d10-8031-b5c04f503232
c1b8e060-d7e2-11dd-8eb0-704d7b2d05b4
03d502e0-045e-0528-9f06-860700080009
1e5c2c40-d7da-11dd-a6e8-2c4d54d85f4a
4c4c4544-0032-5a10-8038-b7c04f574432
4c4c4544-0020-2010-8020-a0c04f202020
4c4c4544-0051-3910-804c-c7c04f4e4e32
4c4c4544-0052-3510-8047-b5c04f523732
4c4c4544-004d-5810-8038-b8c04f514332
4c4c4544-005a-5210-8050-b5c04f5a3332
21a98280-d7da-11dd-87d1-08626637239b
4c4c4544-0035-5610-804c-c3c04f334c32
d21772a0-72ba-11e3-88a2-305a3a8222dc
88c11c80-d7da-11dd-aff7-305a3a00771a
295b6b60-d7da-11dd-9913-704d7b2e5e38
031b021c-040d-05e6-1806-650700080009
a0908ac6-3324-eb45-a32f-7b530e11728d
35304535-3439-3541-3946-3942ffffffff
644d0e80-b900-11dc-ae7a-e03f499f8964
038d0240-045c-051a-4b06-3f0700080009
4c4c4544-0037-4210-8035-c8c04f425131
44454c4c-3500-1043-8036-b3c04f584431
d96d3c2a-7df6-11db-82cc-0011113186f6
4c4c4544-0032-4210-804b-cac04f573532
4c4c4544-004c-5310-8051-c6c04f534732
3fbaf381-538a-11cb-834f-a1949e4827f5
4a0d6f4c-2924-11b2-a85c-a3c4091f1442
4c4c4544-0032-3910-8054-cac04f573532
4c4c4544-0032-3910-8050-cac04f573532
4c4c4544-004d-5810-8038-b8c04f514332
6891600c-4877-440a-bc49-b049ad7f12c7
5113027f-7037-11e4-bb8f-38a21a2efcff
03000200-0400-0500-0006-000700080009
00000000-0000-0000-0000-448a5bce8647
27b02c60-d7da-11dd-956c-38d547aac192
038d0240-045c-05b8-7e06-a00700080009
41f1e380-4c54-c742-b8ef-df1a395882db
4c4c4544-0031-5910-8032-b5c04f483132
aaffcdc0-a9b5-d359-951d-137db2ca81e8
44ec9c00-d7da-11dd-a5d8-086266c5cece
b1b3e073-3709-11e8-8a95-8c16455f56b3
4c4c4544-0033-5a10-8038-b6c04f574432
4c4c4544-004c-5a10-8038-c3c04f574432
73582780-d7da-11dd-b4b0-1831bfb4e152
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device_id
4C530001150804105195
4C530001150804105195
4C530001150804105195
4C530001150804105195
4C530001150804105195
4C530001150804105195
4C530001150804105195
4C530001150804105195
4C530001200804105193
4C530001200804105193
4C531001620804101070
4C531001620804101070
4C530001150804105195
4C530001150804105195
4C530001150804105195
4C530001150804105195
4C530001110804105303
4C530001110804105303
4C530001110804105303
4C530001150804105195
4C531001620804101070
4C531001530804101071
4C530001260804101000
070A7AED87BD3954
070A7AED87BD3954
4C530001260804101000
4C530001260804101000
4C530001270804101000
4C530001270804101000
4C530001270804101000
4C530001270804101000
4C530001270804101000
4C530001150804105090
4C530001260804105083
4C530001160804105194
4C530001210524108581
4C530001210524108581
4C530001210524108581
4C530001150804105195
4C530001290804105300
4C530001290804105300
4C530001130804105302
4C530001130804105302
4C530001150804105195

cpu_model
Intel(R)_Core(TM)_i5-4200M_CPU_@_2.50GHz
Intel(R)_Core(TM)_i7-6700K_CPU_@_4.00GHz
AMD_A8-9600_RADEON_R7__10_COMPUTE_CORES_4C_6G
Intel(R)_Core(TM)_i7-7700K_CPU_@_4.20GHz
Intel(R)_Core(TM)_i7-6820HQ_CPU_@_2.70GHz
Intel(R)_Core(TM)_i5-3210M_CPU_@_2.50GHz
Intel(R)_Core(TM)_i5-7200U_CPU_@_2.50GHz
Intel(R)_Core(TM)_m5-6Y57_CPU_@_1.10GHz
Intel(R)_Core(TM)_i7-6820HK_CPU_@_2.70GHz
Intel(R)_Core(TM)_i5-7300HQ_CPU_@_2.50GHz
Intel(R)_Core(TM)_i5-4570T_CPU_@_2.90GHz
Intel(R)_Core(TM)_i7-7500U_CPU_@_2.70GHz
Intel(R)_Core(TM)_i7-6700T_CPU_@_2.80GHz
Intel(R)_Core(TM)_i5-6500_CPU_@_3.20GHz
Intel(R)_Core(TM)_i5-6500_CPU_@_3.20GHz
Intel(R)_Pentium(R)_CPU_G4400_@_3.30GHz
Intel(R)_Core(TM)_i7-4710HQ_CPU_@_2.50GHz
AMD_A8-3870_APU_with_Radeon(tm)_HD_Graphics
AMD_FX(tm)-8320_Eight-Core_Processor
Intel(R)_Core(TM)_i5-6400_CPU_@_2.70GHz
Intel(R)_Core(TM)_i5-2400S_CPU_@_2.50GHz
Intel(R)_Core(TM)2_Duo_CPU_____T7500__@_2.20GHz
Intel(R)_Core(TM)2_CPU_________X6800__@_2.93GHz
Intel(R)_Core(TM)_i7-4940MX_CPU_@_3.10GHz
Intel(R)_Core(TM)_i5-6300U_CPU_@_2.40GHz
Intel(R)_Core(TM)_i7-4600U_CPU_@_2.10GHz
Intel(R)_Core(TM)_i7-6600U_CPU_@_2.60GHz
Intel(R)_Core(TM)_i7-4940MX_CPU_@_3.10GHz
Intel(R)_Core(TM)_i7-4940MX_CPU_@_3.10GHz
Intel(R)_Core(TM)_i7-6820HK_CPU_@_2.70GHz
Intel(R)_Core(TM)_i7-6770HQ_CPU_@_2.60GHz
Intel(R)_Core(TM)_i7-4600M_CPU_@_2.90GHz
AMD_Phenom(tm)_II_X6_1045T_Processor
Intel(R)_Core(TM)_i7-4790K_CPU_@_4.00GHz
Intel(R)_Core(TM)_i7-6700_CPU_@_3.40GHz
Intel(R)_Core(TM)_i7-6700K_CPU_@_4.00GHz
Intel(R)_Celeron(R)_CPU__N3050__@_1.60GHz
Intel(R)_Core(TM)_i5-4300U_CPU_@_1.90GHz
Intel(R)_Core(TM)_i5-2415M_CPU_@_2.30GHz
Intel(R)_Core(TM)_i5-4690K_CPU_@_3.50GHz
Intel(R)_Core(TM)_i5-8250U_CPU_@_1.60GHz
Intel(R)_Core(TM)_i7-6820HQ_CPU_@_2.70GHz
Intel(R)_Core(TM)_i7-6820HQ_CPU_@_2.70GHz
Intel(R)_Core(TM)_i7-8086K_CPU_@_4.00GHz

cpu_sig
3_60_6
3_94_6
1_101_21
9_158_6
3_94_6
9_58_6
9_142_6
3_78_6
3_94_6
9_158_6
3_60_6
9_142_6
3_94_6
3_94_6
3_94_6
3_94_6
3_60_6
0_1_18
0_2_21
3_94_6
7_42_6
10_15_6
6_15_6
3_60_6
3_78_6
1_69_6
3_78_6
3_60_6
3_60_6
3_94_6
3_94_6
3_60_6
0_10_16
3_60_6
3_94_6
3_94_6
3_76_6
1_69_6
7_42_6
3_60_6
10_142_6
3_94_6
3_94_6
10_158_6

cpu_arch
x86_64_1_2
x86_64_1_4
x86_64_1_2
x86_64_1_4
x86_64_1_4
x86_64_1_2
x86_64_1_2
x86_64_1_2
x86_64_1_4
x86_64_1_4
x86_64_1_2
x86_64_1_2
x86_64_1_4
x86_64_1_4
x86_64_1_4
x86_64_1_2
x86_64_1_4
x86_64_1_4
x86_64_1_4
x86_64_1_4
x86_64_1_4
x86_64_1_2
x86_64_1_2
x86_64_1_4
x86_64_1_2
x86_64_1_2
x86_64_1_2
x86_64_1_4
x86_64_1_4
x86_64_1_4
x86_64_1_4
x86_64_1_2
x86_64_1_6
x86_64_1_4
x86_64_1_4
x86_64_1_4
x86_64_1_2
x86_64_1_2
x86_64_1_2
x86_64_1_4
x86_64_1_4
x86_64_1_4
x86_64_1_4
x86_64_1_6

APPENDIX I
Results
result
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44

cpu
Intel Core i5-4200M
Intel Core i7-6700K
AMD A8-9600
Intel Core i7-7700K
Intel Core i7-6820HQ
Intel Core i5-3210M
Intel Core i5-7200U
Intel Core m5-6Y57
Intel Core i7-6820HK
Intel Core i5-7300HQ
Intel Core i5-4570T
Intel Core i7-7500U
Intel Core i7-6700T
Intel Core i5-6500
Intel Core i5-6500
Intel Pentium G4400
Intel Core i7-4710HQ
AMD A8-3870
AMD FX-8320
Intel Core i5-6400
Intel Core i5-2400S
Intel Core 2 Duo T7500
Intel Core 2 Ext X6800
Intel Core i7-4940MX
Intel Core i5-6300U
Intel Core i7-4600U
Intel Core i7-6600U
Intel Core i7-4940MX
Intel Core i7-4940MX
Intel Core i7-6820HK
Intel Core i7-6770HQ
Intel Core i7-4600M
AMD Phenom II X6 1045T
Intel Core i7-4790K
Intel Core i7-6700
Intel Core i7-6700K
Intel Celeron N3050
Intel Core i5-4300U
Intel Core i5-2415M
Intel Core i5-4690K
Intel Core i5-8250U
Intel Core i7-6820HQ
Intel Core i7-6820HQ
Intel Core i7-8086K

mem
4 GB
32 GB
4 GB
32 GB
16 GB
6 GB
8 GB
8 GB
32 GB
8 GB
16 GB
8 GB
16 GB
8 GB
8 GB
4 GB
16 GB
16 GB
16 GB
16 GB
6 GB
4 GB
8 GB
16 GB
8 GB
8 GB
16 GB
16 GB
16 GB
32 GB
32 GB
16 GB
8 GB
16 GB
16 GB
16 GB
4 GB
16 GB
8 GB
16 GB
8 GB
16 GB
16 GB
16 GB
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aes_inst
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
FALSE
FALSE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE

aes_bench gflops
1922.36
5.305
3186
16.03
1403.69
6.008
3400.2
17.07
2699.43
11.18
154.1
5.008
2330.57
5.856
2101.33
3.681
2705.37
12.13
2622.02
11.14
2240.96
6.046
2637.85
6.017
2701.22
12.03
2720.82
11.63
2722.88
11.62
2505.69
5.807
2173.13
11.1
134.62
3.858
1612.13
11.46
2474.42
11.56
1432.64
8.052
104.71
2.181
127.94
2.761
2485.12
12.24
2220.39
5.54
2049.84
3.996
2562.98
5.549
848.54
4.976
2487.65
12.1
2703.86
12.14
2627.38
12.23
2242.54
6.408
143.96
7.667
2743.04
16.01
3016.95
14.17
3148.33
15.03
311.17
1.555
1236.97
1.28
1262.82
4.465
2690.83
14.94
2555.72
11.35
2624
11.4
2703.61
10.32
3754.83
23.2

APPENDIX J
Encoded Results
result
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
39
40
41
42
43
44

aes_bench gflops
aes_inst cpu
1922.36
5.305
1
3186
16.03
1
1403.69
6.008
1
3400.2
17.07
1
2699.43
11.18
1
154.1
5.008
0
2330.57
5.856
1
2101.33
3.681
1
2705.37
12.13
1
2622.02
11.14
1
2240.96
6.046
1
2637.85
6.017
1
2701.22
12.03
1
2720.82
11.63
1
2722.88
11.62
1
2505.69
5.807
1
2173.13
11.1
1
134.62
3.858
0
1612.13
11.46
1
2474.42
11.56
1
1432.64
8.052
1
104.71
2.181
0
127.94
2.761
0
2485.12
12.24
1
2220.39
5.54
1
2049.84
3.996
1
2562.98
5.549
1
2487.65
12.1
1
2703.86
12.14
1
2627.38
12.23
1
2242.54
6.408
1
143.96
7.667
0
2743.04
16.01
1
3016.95
14.17
1
3148.33
15.03
1
311.17
1.555
1
1262.82
4.465
1
2690.83
14.94
1
2555.72
11.35
1
2624
11.4
1
2703.61
10.32
1
3754.83
23.2
1
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scale
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

mem
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
1

0
4
0
4
3
1
2
2
4
2
3
2
3
2
2
0
3
3
3
3
1
0
2
3
2
2
3
3
4
4
3
2
3
3
3
0
2
3
2
3
3
3

